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This thesis examines the political arena of the oil
industry, and the decision-makers of the Arab oil countries.
The two primary areas of study are OPEC and the various
political relationships, both inter-Arab and Arab-Western.
The oil weapon strategies are analyzed as a form of deter-
rence.
The main hypothesis is that these countries have three
options available in which to utilize their oil weapon:
embargo; production slow down; and price fixing and raising.
The potential of each option is analyzed in detail based on
the attitudes, goals, reactions and various oil market roles
of the countries involved. The conclusion reached is that,
with only those three options available, the oil weapon is
becoming less of a credible deterrent. Only total embargo
currently remains as a plausible option. Both sides are
beginning to realize that an equilibrium state of supply and
demand is the only realistic alternative to ensure that all
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY
The Middle East is an area that has become exceedingly
important politically, militarily and economically. The
area's political role is articulated through the involvements
of all the major powers thus making the Middle East a major
"actor" in international relations. The Arab-Israeli con-
flict and the area's emergence as a leader in the Third
World are just two examples of this region's political
importance. The main facet of the area's military importance
is the strategic location of the Suez Canal. The canal pro-
vides a quick means of circumventing the long trip around
Africa "by military warships of various countries which
shuttle back and forth between the Mediterranean Sea and the
Indian Ocean. Oil tankers and merchant ships also utilize
the Suez Canal as an efficient means of reaching Western
markets. However, from the standpoint of this thesis, the
area's economic importance takes precedence over the other
two factors. The Middle East is the primary supplier of
oil, the world's major energy source. Eor this reason, the
region quite possibly holds the key to international economic
stability, since this stability can be directly linked to
the supply and demand cycle for oil consumption. Conse-
quently, the oil situation has been transferred into the
political arena. Now, whenever key issues on such topics as

international agreements, treaties, trade, foreign aid, etc.,
are considered, the oil situation takes on new importance as
an essential factor in the decision-making process for all
nations
.
This thesis examines the political arena of the oil
industry, and the decision-makers of the Arab oil countries
(Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwayt and Libya). The analysis will
be based on an understanding of their goals, strategies,
reactions, interactions and various roles in the oil market
and the effect that these factors can have on oil supplies.
One of the primary foci of study will be the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC was
organized in i960 with the principle aim being "the unifica-
tion of petroleum policies for the member countries and the
determination of the best means for safeguarding the inter-
est of member countries individually and collectively."
The Middle East members of OPEC used an oil embargo in 1973
to demonstrate to the world just how much power the oil wea-
pon could wield against the strategic alliance between the
United States and other Western powers, particularly since
Middle Eastern oil supplies were crucial to the economies
and energy requirements of the European countries of NATO
and Japan. Understanding the various Arab policy makers and
their roles in OPEC is critical in order to determine just
Rouhani, F. , A History of OPEC




what might compel them to employ the oil weapon again and
by what means they would choose to utilize it.
The other main area of study will "be the various politi-
cal relationships "both inter-Arab and Arab-Western, One of
the most important areas for consideration here is the re-
lationships which evolve from interactions between the host
states and foreign oil companies. The foreign oil companies
have become prime political pivots between two opposing sides
concerning the issue of control, development and market of
this vital and expendable economic resource. The oil com-
panies "constitute a substantial foreign element in the midst
of a society whose general tendency is to free itself from
2dependence on external powers and influences." The atti-
tudes of the various oil producers toward the issues involved
in this context will certainly influence any decision-making
process.
The main hypothesis of this thesis, therefore, is that
Arab oil countries today have three options available in
which to utilize their oil weapon: embargo; production slow
down; and price fixing and raising. The Arabs are by nature
very cautious in their role as actor states; their politi-
cal environment highly restricts their policy options. The
environment can become a major factor when decision-makers
try to operate rationally.
2Lenczowski, G. , Oil and State in the Middle East , p. 3
Cornell University Press , i960.

The methodology employed for this thesis will be an
analysis of the Arabian oil countries" policies utilizing
the Allison Governmental Politics model and the Snyder
Decision-making modelo Their strategies will be analyzed
as a form of deterrence proposed by Herman Kahn„ Areas of
analysis will be (a) various viewpoints of the Arab decision-
makers for the four major oil producing countries (Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Kuwayt and Libya), (b) interrelationships
with other Middle Eastern nations, (c) the roles played by
the four countries within OPEC, and (d) various strategies
and scenarios in which policy options may be exercised.
Prior to beginning this analysis, some background information
on the history of oil development and the oil environment
today will be presented,,
B. BACKGROUND INFORMTI ON
1 o Development of the Oil Industry in the Arab Nations
Ever since the advent of the Crusades, which saw the
decline from glory of the Islamic Empire, the Middle East
has been a region under the constant domination of foreign
influence until the mid-twentieth century. However, the
foreign domination has not necessarily been totally detri-
mental to the area's development The waves of Crusaders
brought economic prosperity and increased trade; the Ottoman
Turks encouraged some industrial and agricultural reforms
and also education (mostly through allowing the entrance of
Western missionaries) „ In the late 1700's, European desire
for control of the countries on the Eastern Mediterranean
10

"began with the French invasion of Egypt. However, full con-
trol was not relinquished by the Turks until the mid-1 800* s.
In the beginning, much of the European and American domina-
tion of the area was not political or economical, but cul-
tural, in the form of missions, schools, hospitals, and
colleges that had lasting effects on the ideas and life-
styles of the region. The Americans were in the area not
to rule, but to help establish a better way of life (and
thus helped to prepare the people for the economic impact
of the oil discoveries) through the establishment of colleges,
such as the Syrian Protestant College (now the American
University of Beirut) and the American University of Cairo,
and through the work of organizations such as the Near East
Foundation and the Arabian Mission. As Charles Hamilton
pointed out:
"Many persons feel that American commercial interests
might not have had the opportunity to participate in
the development of the great oil fields of the Middle
East had it not been for the splendid work of the
Arabian Mission. "3
The birth of the oil industry occurred in the nine-
teenth century when animal and vegetable fats and oils be-
came inadequate in meeting the domestic and industrial needs
of a growing world population. Development and drilling be-
gan in America, Europe and Russia; since the potential of the
Middle East was not realized until the early twentieth
3
^Hamilton, C.W. , Americans and Oil in the Middle East
,
p. 12, Gulf Publishing Company, 1962.
11

century, even though both the Bible and early Greek litera-
ture recorded the surface signs of hidden liquid and gaseous
petroleum reserves.
Exploitation and control of the area was mostly in
the hands of the British with the exception of Saudia Arabia.
American participation did not begin until the late 1920*
s
after much diplomatic struggling, and the influence of this
participation was to promote the idea of a free-enterprise
system. The idea of free-enterprise slowly gained ground as
British domination began to diminish.
The first major watershed in the exploitation of
Middle Eastern oil reserves occurred in 1913 in Iran when
the British Admiralty under Winston Churchill decided to
fuel the Royal Navy with oil instead of coal, and in the
years to follow British, American, French and Canadian oil
companies were operating in all the various oil producing
countries. By the end of World War II, "the oil industry
that operated in the Middle East represented an inter-
national cartel... who in essence had usurped sovereignty
over the Middle East's most important economic resource."
In the mid-50' s, the Middle East had formed a closely
connected oil region of producing and transporting states,
and became the "major single supplier of oil in the
Ismael, T.Y. , The Middle East in World Politics
, p. 227,
Syracuse University Press, 197^.
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international market. "^ Today, with 6ofo of the world's
proven oil reserves and control in the hands of the indivi-
dual countries, the area has the capability of meeting world
requirements. However, maintaining the necessary production
levels and realistic prices, so that enough oil is available,
has become a political as well as an economic issue.
The major Arab oil producing nations are Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Kuwayt, and Libya. Other nations involved in
oil politics are minor Arab producers Egypt and the United
Arab Emirates, oil transiting nations Syria, Lebanon and
Jordan, and the major non-Arab oil producing nation Iran.
The following is a brief history of oil development for
some of the major producers.
Saudi Arabia, now the area's largest producer, was
the only country exploited completely by American oil com-
panies. The original concession granted in 1933 to Standard
Oil of California was taken over by ARAMCO (Arabian American
Oil Company) with interests held by Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia, Texas Company, Standard Oil Company (N. J.) and
Socony Mobil Oil Company. Two major issues arose between
ARAMCO and the Saudi government. The first was the financial
terms of the concession, which was settled when Saudi Arabia
served as a pioneer and introduced the 50-50 tax plan, which
while serving to increase Saudi revenues did not affect
Shwadran, B. , The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers
,
p. ^36, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955.
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American companies since the tax was paid on profits before
paying foreign taxes and served as a credit against payment
of U.S. taxes „ The other dispute involved land, and ARAMCO
relinquished several areas of its vast territories to he
explored and developed by Petromin, the Saudi Arabian Na-
tional Oil Company, organized in 19&2. Petromin became the
most active national oil company in the realm of diversifi-
cation and promotion of oil-related industries and develop-
ments, especially in the field of petrochemicals.
Iraq was chronologically the second big oil producing
country (the first being Iran) The original concession was
granted to Germany prior to World War I , and secured by the
British and French after Germany's defeat. In 1925 > the
Iraq Petroleum Company was formed (interests were held by
British, French and American companies) and acquired the
right to develop over almost all of Iraq with a concession
granted until 2000. This concession underwent many modifi-
cations culminating in 1961 with the Iranian takeover of
99 5f<> of the area. The IPC, with their five percent, still
maintained control over most of the producing area, but all
exploratory and future exploitation of the remainder of the
land was granted to the Iraqian National Oil Company, IPC
still, however, remains important to Iraq for its services
7in marketing.
Schurr, S., and others, Middle Eastern Oil and the
Western World







Kuwayt, a British protectorate until 1963, is one
of the biggest producers when the country's total land area
for oil development is taken into consideration. The con-
cession for development granted in 193^ "to the Kuwayt Oil
Company was jointly owned by American (Gulf) and British
(Anglo-Persian) oil companies. In 1962, the Kuwayt National
Petroleum Company was formed to develop areas relinquished
by the KOC Kuwayt, with the highest per capita income of
the region, has become a country so rich that it now "banks
oil" against a fluctuating monetary market by establishing
Q
a daily ceiling on oil production,,
Libya evolved as a significant oil source following
the initial Suez Canal in 19^5 . Initial exploration began
in 195^ but development was soon intensified with commercial
production beginning around 1961. Unlike the other countries
that granted concessions for exploration and development,
Libya passed a Petroleum Law in 1955 and invited oil com-
panies to bid for concessions. By 1968 , there were 37
companies holding grants, representing American, British,
French, Italian and German interests „ The upsurge in con-
cessions, coupled with the recognition of the country's
geographical advantage to European markets caused the Libyan
government to establish the National Oil Company LIPETCO
(Libyan General Petroleum Corporation) in 1968 to oversee all
Q
new concessions. Under Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya became
p
Ismael, T.Y. , op, cit . , p. 233.
97Schurr, S B| and others, op. cit . , p. 118.
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one of the first nations to successfully seek total nationa-
lization and control of oil companies operating within the
country.
Though the four countries mentioned above produce
the bulk of exported oil, small quantities are produced in
Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, Neutral Zone (Kuwayt-Saudi Arabia),
Turkey and Israel. Egypt, unlike the other countries did
not grant a major concession,. Instead the land was divided
into plots to be developed by various foreign companies
10
either solely or in partnership with Egyptian enterprises
.
Oil for the United Arab Emirates was developed mainly by
American and British Companies, and there was one Japanese
concession in Qatar.
Of importance here is the impact of one non-Arab
oil producer, Iran (Persia). Iran, the first country to
produce oil, granted the original concession to W.K. D*Arcy,
but the Anglo-Persian oil company acquired full control over
the area in 1909. The oil produced at this time was impor-
tant for fueling the British Royal Navy. For the next ^0
years Britain successfully dominated the region. Prior to
World War II, Russia had unsuccessfully tried to assert
claim over oil rights in Northern Iran. In the mid-50's the
government of Iran took over the properties and entrusted
the oil operations to an International Consortium (mostly
British and American with a small French interest) which
10Lenczowski, G„ , op. cit . , p. 21.
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would operate on behalf of the state, under the administra-
tive responsibility of the National Iranian Oil Company,,
In central Iran the NIOC carried out some exploration and
drilling on its own„
Furthermore, in the late 50' s Iran also allowed
other foreign oil companies to bid for development of areas
which were outside the territory of the Consortium, and in
most cases would then enter into a partnership with these
companies (examples are the Iran Canada Oil Company and the
Iran Pan American Oil Company). Following World War II,
Iran had made the first attempt of any of the oil producers
to gain full control of the oil companies, mainly desired
because of the increasing difference between oil revenues
paid the country and tax payments paid to foreign govern-
ments. This attempt, though unsuccessful, pointed out the
tension of the oil producing countries over the control
held by foreign companies and the desires for nationaliza-
11tion--a situation which exploded in the seventies
„
The so-called transit group (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon
and Jordan) are important because even though these countries
do not produce oil, their actions and policies are relevant
to the foreign interests that import oil and the foreign
companies that produce oil and need to find ways to get it
to the markets o Oil transits Syria, Lebanon and Jordan
thru pipelines, and when open, transits Egypt via the Suez
Canal. The oil produced in Iraq and Saudi Arabia (two of
1
1
Schurr, S., and others, op. cit . , p. 11^-115.
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the four major producers) must cross Syria giving that country
a highly strategic position. The other major route used to
be the Suez Canal, which transported the exports of Iran,
Kuwayt, and Saudi Arabia, and will now probably resume this
12
role since it has reopened. Permission to lay pipelines
is a big area of negotiation between the oil companies
granted concessions to develop and export, and the transit
countries. It is thus easy to understand how Libyan oil
became so important in such a short time-frame, due mainly
to its ready availability for European markets without
involving other countries
.
Historically speaking, it was the Suez crisis and
shutdown of the Canal in 1956 that served as a forewarning
of the dependence of Europe on oil from the Middle East.
Supplies had to be rerouted or received from other sources.
The Suez Canal was reclosed during the 1967 war and did not
reopen until late 1975* This required a major shift in the
routes used to get the oil to the consumers. New pipelines
had to be planned and constructed and supertankers were de-
signed to carry more oil around the Cape of Good Hope. The
impact of the Canal's closing on Egypt's economy was enormous,
since oil tankers paid a high percentage of the Canal's tolls.
By 1971, plans had been made for both the SUMED (Suez-
Mediterranean) and IRTUP (Iran-Turkey) pipelines. Construc-
tion for the SUMED pipeline across Egypt was approved by the
12Lenczowski, G. , op„ cit . , p 25-26.
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government in May, 1972. The fate of these various pipe-
lines is undecided at this time due to the reopening of the
canal
o
2 . Overview of Today's Environment and the Foreign
Interests/Dependence
Today, the United States, Europe, Japan and the
Soviet Union (including the East European "bloc) are in some
way interested in or dependent on the oil supplies of the
Middle East, and this dependence can only increase unless
other energy resources are developed into functional pro-
ducts. While Europe and Japan are the most dependent, the
United States is attempting to become free from any depen-
dence on foreign oil, since this dependence is so important
for American political and economic influence. Additionally,
the Soviet Union has recently taken a hard look at its
policies and has realized the importance and necessities of
the Middle Eastern oil fields for that country.
Though the United States is the world's largest con-
sumer of oil it is not solely dependent on Middle Eastern
oilo Most U.S. oil comes from the Western Hemisphere, with
the bulk of it produced within the country. However, as
consumption increases and reserves dwindle, increased de-
pendence on Middle Eastern oil, can be projected into the
future. The United States does, however, have important
interests in the Middle East oil fields since five out of
seven of the major international oil companies, which explore,




world's oil, are U.S. corporations. J This economic link
has a tremendous effect on United States 1 foreign policy and
its relations with the Middle East, even though the United
States has sought to develop policies limiting dependence
on foreign oil imports by investigating and developing other
sources, e.g., Alaskan oil, and by setting limits and tar-
iffs on the amounts of oil imported for consumption.
Western Europe, having converted largely from a coal
based economy to an oil based one, is highly dependent on
Middle Eastern oil. With few developed oil deposits, Europe
is leading the market in oil importation, mainly from Medi-
terranean area sources. The importance of oil supplies to
meet growing requirements, and therefore, the necessary
reliance on imports has become a situation of pressing
interests to European economists and policy makers. The
area is seeking other energy alternatives mainly through the
development and exploitation of natural gas and nuclear
power, now that coal is seemingly in a decline. However,
even with the development of these resources, imported oil
will still account for a high level of Europe's energy
consumption.
While Europe is the world's largest importing region,
Japan is the world's largest importing country. Like Europe,
13





in the mid-50 1 s Japan, a country with no exploitable oil
deposits, moved from an energy program "based on consumption
of coal and hydroelectric power to one based on oil; and
the country's reliance on importation has been steadily
increasing since that time. Japan currently imports oil
mainly from the Middle East, with additional supplies avail-
able from Southeast Asia, and possibly China,, Unlike Europe,
however, Japan does not have alternative resources available
that could serve to lessen the dependence on oil supplies.
Coal and hydroelectric power are rapidly depleting sources;
reserves of natural gas are so small that they are virtually
unexploi table and account for a very small fraction of the
country's energy consumption. Development of nuclear power
is more risky for Japan than for other areas due to the
problem of earthquakes and dense population centers that
together could cause catastrophic accidents while the
country is experimenting with development of the technology
and product. The Japanese Atomic Energy Commission, never-
theless, did adopt a Long Range Program in the early seven-
ties for development of atomic power with operational power
supplies projected for the late 1970's. The projected capa-
city, however, will have little effect in lessening the
amount of oil imported. Thus, Japan, like Europe, must
seek measures that serve to guard against future possible
supply interruptions. J
15lbid
„ , p. ^8-52.
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While the Soviet Union is not directly interested
in Middle Eastern oil for internal consumption, a hard look
at policy has taken place resulting in an increasing interest
in the oil problems and policies „ Up until the mid-60 1 s,
the Soviets produced a surplus of oil, which was exported
to the East European "bloc countries, and, therefore, the
Soviets were only interested in Middle Eastern oil for (a)
its contribution to the industrial and military power of the
Western nations, and (b) its value as a means of propaganda.
The Soviet Union could denounce the "International" (basic-
ally Western) oil companies as imperialist agents and thus
use this anti-Westernism as a means of forming closer ties
with the Arabs o The Soviets thus encouraged nationalization
of the oil companies as a means of weakening Western power.
In the late 60's, the situation reversed itself, and with
consumption surpassing production, and the desire to retain
the markets currently importing oil from the U.S.S.R. , the
Soviets have had to contemplate either importing oil or
1 6
exploiting at very high expense the Siberian oil fields.
By both importing and exporting oil, certain economic and
technological benefits could be gained, in addition to
retaining the ability to maintain oil independence, and
avoiding depletion of the home source The Soviet entrance
into the Persian Gulf market has necessitated some compro-
mises with ideological and propaganda beliefs, which surely
Berry, J. A. , "Oil and Soviet Policy in the Middle East,"




did not come easily. Attitudes towards Western imperialism
17
and all the evils involved have had to be altered. ' Entry
into the Persian Gulf oil market has further served to com-
plicate foreign relations in such matters as the Arab-Israeli
conflict, since the issues evolving around that region are
constantly intertwined with the oil decisions.
With the understanding that oil has now developed
into a political weapon between the Third World countries
possessing the oil resources and the powerful Western and
Eastern nations requiring this vital energy source, it is
easy to comprehend why it has become essential to analyze
the thoughts and attitudes that lie behind policy decisions
of the oil rich nations, and the strategies that might
possibly develop as a result of their decision-maker's
viewpoints, country interactions and the unity or disunity
of the group within OPEC.
^Hunter, R.E. , "The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East,
Part II, Oil and the Persian Gulf," Adelphi Papers , no. 60,
The Institute of Strategic Studies, 1969.
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II. ATTITUDES AND VIEW-POINTS OF THE ARAB
DECISION-MAKERS
A. THE FOUR MAJOR ARAB OIL PRODUCERS
Though many countries in the world produce oil, when an
analyst tries to determine what or whose policies could im-
pact on world oil consumption, he needs to study the Arab
nations to find the policies that could affect oil supplies
the most. The study could he narrowed even further to the
four major Arab oil producing nations --Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Kuwayt and Libya. Algeria, Arab and most radical, is not
a major producer, and Iran, the second largest producer,
is non-Arab. These two countries will be discussed only
briefly in the following section since they influence more
than control policy, due to their quasi -independent status.
The Big Four, as they shall be referred to throughout this
thesis, will each be analyzed as separate entities in this
subsection and then considered as a group for the rest of
the chapter.
1. Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is both the largest country and by a
slight margin the largest oil producer in the area. This
monarchial state is the seat of the Muslim religion; it is
also the most powerful nation in the Arab world in terms of
wealtho Saudi Arabian oil production capability, reported
to be ^23 million metric tons in 197^ is almost equivalent to
the combined amount produced by all the other Arab countries
24

1 Piin the region. This fact, however, does not enable the
country to maintain a leadership position over all the other
Arab oil countries. The country's viewpoints toward oil are
extremely important in determining Arab oil policy, since
Saudi Arabia does take the lead on any issue for the conser-
vative group, which includes Kuwayt, the United Arab Emirates,
and the smaller producers. Thus, this country is one of the
major barometers for interpreting or forecasting any trends
concerning various phases of oil production and exportation.
Saudi Arabia is a family-ruled monarchy with many
members of the king's family serving as the ministers and
deputies. Thus one royal family basically runs the country
even though factions may arise within it. The oil industry
and modernization has created a new working middle class
from this formerly predominant Bedouin nation, but the govern-
ment has not allowed any outlet for their political thought,
such as political parties, and consequently, policy decisions
are autocratic in nature, and influenced by religion, extreme
conservatism and traditionalism,,
Saudi Arabia has the most conservative oil policies
of any of the major countries to be considered. In 1962,
the country was one of the last to establish its own national
oil company, PETROMIN, the Saudi Arabian General Petroleum
and Mineral Organization, with the mission to develop all
197^.
1 R




minerals and not concentrate strictly on oil. 7 Unlike the
other states, Saudi Arabia has not sought to nationalize the
foreign oil companies, but stresses the moderate stand of
participation. Two factors bearing directly on the Saudi
position of participation is Aramco' s efforts to "Saudize"
its operations and the Saudi's awareness that Aramco is
backed by vast financial reserves which may be needed for
20development of several new fields
„
For the past year the country has been negotiating
with Aramco for full takeover of the company's assets. Oil
Minister Yamani stressed the Arab's right "to control their
oil industry,," However, the government also took the posi-
tion that this takeover did not constitute nationalization
and would only take place following agreement of terms by
21both sides. The Saudi aim is mainly to ensure greater
control over market price and production capacity,, Saudi
policy makers believe that the quantities that each company
could produce should be tied to the industrialization pro-
jects and development programs within the country, in other
words, program production levels exclusively in terms of
national interest. This attitude is complicated by a "moral
responsibility" that results from the awareness of not only
1 7Schurr, S , and others, op_o_cit. , p. 129
.
20
Mosley, L. , Power Play , Random House, 1973.
21
"Aramco: End of the Road," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 6,
no. 6, p 2, 10 February 1975.
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needs of oil consumers, but also the needs of poor, develop-
ing Third World nations, which require financial aid from
22
oil revenues. The country thus presses for adequate
consumer-producer dialogues and working relationships so
that the best interests of all parties may be served in all
areas of production capacity.
The assassination of King Faysal Ben Abdul Aziz on
March 25, 1975, created concern over how Saudi oil policies
might be affected. Faysal had been a leader in both insti-
gating and ending the 1973 oil embargo and served as the
OPEC moderating influence by constantly opposing price in-
creases and production cutbacks. Also he sought to main-
tain friendly ties with the U.S., while simultaneously being
very willing to let the U.S. try to solve the conflict while
he sided with the Arab nations against Israel.
Now, even though King Kalid is on the throne, Crown
Prince Fahd controls internal politics. Indications are
such that he will probably see that Saudi Arabia pursues the
same moderate policy lines, since he still remains head of
the Supreme Petroleum Council, the body that formulates
guidelines for the country's oil and investment policies.
Continuity can be maintained since membership in the council
is unchanged from Faysal' s reign. Prince Fahd does not be-
lieve in threatening the oil weapon in advance as a means of
22
"Saudi Arabia: Changing Face of the Oil Industry,"
An-Nahar Arab Report , v 6, no. 28, p. 3, 1^ July 1975.
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exerting negative pressure at bargaining session,, This does
not mean that he wouldn't hesitate in favoring another embar-
go should there be an Arab military defeat. The main con-
flict that could have a future affect on Western ties lies
between Oil Minister Yamani and Prince Fahd. Yamani favors
closer ties with the U.S. than Fahd, who leans more towards
Europe. The conflict was present prior to King Faysal'
s
death and fueled by rumors that Yamani would be removed and
replaced by Saud al Faysal. Installation of Prince Saud as
State Minister for Foreign Affairs has left Yamani 1 s posi-
23tion secure, at least for the present. J
As will be brought out later in the discussion of
OPEC, Saudi Arabia leads the moderates on prices and pro-
duction levels. The country itself has not started regula-
ting production as a means of conserving its resources for
the future. This lack of regulation is probably due to the
fact that the world's largest proven reserves lie within its
borders. Saudi Arabia is the strongest proponent of consumer-
producer dialogues, which it believes should serve as the
foundation for working relationships and mutual agreements
on all issues relating to oil development, production and
exportation within the world. Not all countries are so
conservative, however, and Iraq, the next country to be
considered, has at times been one of the most radical in
terms of its Arab nationalist ideology and politics.
23"The Death of Faysal: A Void to be Filled," An-Nahar




Iraq is one of the more radical Arab oil producing
nations o The revolutionary government, headed by President
Ahmed Hassan Bakr, continually seeks to link oil operations
with politics. Also, by maintaining ties with Communist
bloc countries, Iraq hinders Western oil company operations.
Iraq was one of the first countries to start nationalization
of oil companies by having the state-owned Iraq Company for
Oil Operations take over the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in
1972 o IPC was at that time responsible for production of
approximately S5% of the state's oil. The state also owns
the Iraq National Oil Company. The kj/o American share in
Basrah Petroleum Company was nationalized in October, 1973.
as a result of U.S. support of Israel during the war. Nation-
alization of the oil industry in Iraq has been so successful
thus far, that when Saddam Hussein, Vice-President of the
Revolutionary Council, spoke to oil ministry personnel on
June 1, 1975 > concerning the implications of nationalization,
the speech served as a warning to the remaining foreign
countries with shares in the Basrah Petroleum Company that a
third takeover might be on the horizon. This takeover would
eliminate the last foreign oil concessions remaining in the
country. Public confidence in the Iraqi regime has been







Hussein to the effect that "had it not been for the nationa-
lization decision, 'we would not have been an independent
state'." 25
Iraq believes that production programming is the key
plank to maintaining supply-demand -surplus equilibrium and
has currently scaled down its target for production and ex-
porting capacity from the 1972 plan of 325 million tons/year
to be reached by 198O, to a present target of 200 million
tons/year to be reached by 1982. According to Oil Minister
Tayih 'abd al-Karim the production policies are determined
by the extent of oil reserves, the world market conditions,
26
and the country's financial needs for development. Cur-
rently, Iraq's ambitious development plans need money making
the problem of surplus oil revenues nonexistent. The Iraq
National Oil Company has the highest priority in exploration
and development since the roles of foreign firms are highly
restrictive. Unlike other nations, Iraq does not believe
in any joint ventures or production sharing with foreign
27interests. ' The main ideology driving the country's policies
is the Ba'th party's idea of a "rapid development of the
economy in a limited period of time," a policy requiring
28
large and immediate revenues
.
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Iraq remains one of the main countries consistently
seeking oil price increases. Oil Minister al-Karim stresses
a "fair price for oil linked to the prices of food commodi-
ties, other raw materials and manufactured goods and to see
the adoption of a new international economic system "based on
justice and equal international relations without harming
29
anyone." 7 This policy is in support of President al-Bakr's
conviction that Iraq would be against any policy harmful to
consumers as long as the rights and interests of producers
are not violated. Iraq views U.S. interests as an imper-
ialist plan to dominate the world's economy and to exploit
the national resources of various countries. Thus all
policies are directed towards confronting imperialism and
insuring legitimate interests in such a way that they may
serve as an example to other struggling countries, and thus
attempt to promote unity and solidarity among oil producing
nations.-^ This philosophy is particularly reflected in
Iraq's role within OPEC.
3. Kuwayt
Kuwayt, the tiny amirate on the Arabian Peninsula,
is the richest Arab oil producing nation when country size
and per capita income are considered as factors of determi-
nation. Though ruled by the amir, His Highness Shaykh Sabah
297
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as-Salim as-Sabah, the actual day-to-day policy decisions
and announcements are determined by the various members of
the Council of Ministers in accordance with the constitution.
The government itself is largely a family affair with offi-
cials appointed from among the amir's relatives. The regime's
leanings toward moderation are threatened by the non-voting
non-Kuwayti majority, many of whom are intelligent and
31
resentful Palestinians. Since oil constitutes approximately
95?£ of the state's income and results in roughly 99^ of its
32 ....total exports, the Kuwayti Oil Minister 'abd al-Mutalib
Kazimi wields much of the power for any type of policy
decision which involves oil revenues.
In 1972, the Kuwayti government began to worry about
the extent of oil reserves which at the then current rate of
33production would be exhausted by the late 1980's„-^ Since
that time they have been controlling daily production levels
to conserve oil reserves and spread out oil revenues, much
of which is funneled back to other Arab nations thru the
Kuwayt Fund for Arab Economic Development. This fund has
been providing capital to other developing Arab countries
since 1961.
The country's own Kuwayt National Petroleum Company
is not beginning to serve as the "administrative right arm
-* Mosley, L. , op. cit. , p. ^30.
3
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for its oil policy." The country has been negotiating for
a full takeover of the Kuwayt Oil Company, the original
foreign oil concession company,, Currently Kuwayt holds a
6ofo share and seeks takeover terms of compensation and
technical cooperation that would he agreeable to all parties
concerned o The government has never sought outright
nationalization, but has adopted the policy of negotiation
leading to amicable takeover. However, if agreement can not
be reached nationalization could be the only answer.
In an address to the National Assembly on July 12,
1975 i Oil Minister Kazimi issued a long statement delineating
the Kuwayti oil policies and objectives „ The four main points
were to "assure the conservation of oil resources by apply-
ing the most advanced production techniques. „ . .to develop
as much as possible the processing industries, especially
refining, petrochemicals and gas processing,
. , .to assure that
the largest possible share of Kuwayti exports is carried on
tankers carrying the Kuwayti or other Arab flag, (and)...
to protect Kuwayti consumers of oil products by reduced
prices of products destined for local consumption."^ In
line with this policy the Higher Petroleum Council was
3 "Oil Market Trends," The Middle East Economic and Oil
Review, Arab Press Service , no. 99 > P« 11, 30 June 1975.
-^"Kuwait: Still on the Conservative Path,"
Arab Report , v. 6, no. 3^, p. ^, 25 August 1975.
^ "Kuwait: Oil Policy State
v. 6, no. 30, p, 1, 28 July 1975
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established by the government as part of a total restructur-
ing of the oil sector in order that full government control
may be maintained. This council is charged specifically to
"define policy for the conservation and exploitation of oil
resources, develop oil-based industries, and establish an
integrated national oil industry. "^' This oil policy is
basically conservative and on a domestic level only. Nothing
is. stated explicitly with regard to the international scene,
though as will be shown, Kuwayt takes a moderate stand with
regard to oil prices and generally falls in line with con-
servative Saudi Arabia on OPEC issues. At present the pro-
duction level is the biggest factor in Kuwayti oil development
and exportation and this level is determined by both the
technical criteria for conservation and the country's
financial requirements, including the various economic aid
programs
.
Kuwayt appears to be the country that has best learned
how to control oil revenues and allocation of funds in a non-
wasteful manner. Having achieved the most "sophisticated
and extensive network of business and financial institutions"
on the Gulf, the country is now branching out into industry
and agriculture o Progress in these areas is hindered by a
lack of water resources and power, but the government is
expanding in three major industries (fishing, food production,




that are related to petrochemicals. Until these areas are
fully developed, however, the government must still seek
foreign investments for its massive oil revenues, investments
which force the country to maintain friendly ties with the
"developed" Western nations, much to the dismay at times of
the Arab World which feels that investments should be made
at home.
^o Libya
Though an Arab oil producing nation, Libya is differ-
ent from any of the other countries previously discussed.
The geographical location, government, and relative newness
of its oil industry all contribute to this dissimilarity.
Located directly on the Mediterranean Sea, Libya's oil
industry of today is a direct result of the necessity of
Western consumers to find convenient oil sources following
the two Suez Canal closures of 1956 and 1967* The industry
developed in an entirely different vein from all other
countries in that oil companies were invited to bid for
concessions under the Petroleum Law of 1955. This resulted
in many independent developers as well as conglomerates and
much foreign interest. These interests served to exploit the
industry and revenues right under the eyes of the government
until 1968 when a national oil company, Libyan General Pet-
roleum Corporation (LIPETCO), was established to oversee the
concessions
o
3 "Kuwait: Spending the Oil Money," An-Nahar Arab Re-port ,
v. 5, no. ^8, p. 3i 2 December 197^.
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When the oil industry was in fledgling status the
government was basically conservative and similar to Saudi
Arabia in its stand on oil policy decisions. Today the
government is revolutionary and theocratic. The ruling
body is a military junta in which Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi
serves as chairman,, Colonel Qadhafi's second in command is
30
the Premier, Major *abd al-Salam Jalud. 7 Though there are
various ministers, including a Minister of Petroleum, *Izz
ad -Din al-Mabruk, most policy decisions are handled directly
at the top and on important issues, mainly oil prices, it
is Colonel al-Qadhafi, himself, who issues any necessary
statement o Libya is a strong proponent of high and ever-
increasing oil prices and believes the price of oil should
have a direct link to the price of commodities. Colonel
al-Qadhafi has stated that "the Libyan Arab Republic is
prepared to reduce the price of its oil in return for re-
ductions offered by the oil-consuming countries in the
prices of their industrial exports."
The major conflict in the Libyan oil industry sector
is nationalization. Since his takeover, Colonel al-Qadhafi's
ambition has been total nationalization of all foreign oil
interests. Major Jalud, on the other hand, recognizes the
Libyan need for the foreign oil companies to provide a sales
•^Mosley, L. , op. cit . , p. ^32.
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outlet and favors participation agreements. At present,
Libya controls slightly over 75$ of the country's oil pro-
duction and Oil Minister Mabruk has stated that there is
currently no intention to seek further control due to
"marketing difficulties, commitments to exploration by the
companies, and the question of investment for the mainte-
nance of production from the existing oil fields „"
The big issue faced by the government with regards
to revenue decisions is the amount of oil reserves and just
how production levels should be adjusted to maintain the
supply of revenue and still resolve the varied economic
problems that face the country,, Libya has no oil producing
surplus capacity which could yield extra revenue if world
demand would increase , All 1975 oil produced was under
contract to world companies and markets, and none was avail-
able for the country to sell outright . Oil Minister Mabruk
has also stated that it has been necessary to cutback pro-
duction within the Republic to "prevent draining the produc-
tive capacity of some fields." J The Libyan economic planners
are now aware that oil can no longer serve as the only source
of revenue and are seeking development in other sectors of
Mosley, L. , op„ cit. , p m-32 o
"Libya: 1975 Industrial Plans," An-Nahar Arab Report ,
v. 6, no. 20, p. k, 19 May 1975.
-^"Libya Has No Surplus," Foreign Broadcast Information




the economy such as agriculture, construction, petrochemi-
cals and shipping. However, development in these areas is
still dependent on the revenues from the fluctuating world
market in its demand for Libyan oil.
The attitudes of the four major Arab oil producers
which have been considered thus far, have the greatest
effect in determining what would constitute an Arab oil
policy. However, other Arab countries and one non-Arab
state can strongly influence or have an effect on any de-
cision or policy made by one of the big four Before dis-
cussing some of the policy interactions that have taken
place between these four countries, it becomes pertinent to
review the influence of these other countries, namely
Algeria, Iran, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.
B. OTHER COUNTRY INFLUENCE
Algeria, a relatively important Arab oil producer, is
the most radical of any to be considered, since it does
not usually fall into line with other Arab nations , Alger-
ian President Boumedienne is the spokesman for Algerian oil
policies, which favor high prices due to the low development
level of the country and the need for immediate revenues
Algeria views exploitation of oil and the demand for lower
prices as imperialist actions. As a leader of developing
Third World nations, Algeria consistently seeks higher reve-
nues, though the country has learned to moderate its position
"Libya: 1975 Industrial Plans," op. cit. , p. 4.
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whenever the result could threaten Arab unity. President
Boumedienne's position favors closer ties between the Arab
World and Western Europe as a means of exchanging raw mater-
ials and labor with technology and experience in a way to
benefit all interests. -* Quite possibly he views Europe
as a lesser threat than the United States since Europe faces
more rampant inflation, a problem shared by the Arab world,
and is seemingly less responsible for the "artificial
raising" of oil prices.
Another oil producing nation directly affecting the Arab
states is Iran. Iran, the second largest producer in the
area behind Saudi Arabia, is non-Arab. In 1951 > Iran tried
unsuccessfully to nationalize its oil assets. By 1953 » the
Shah of Iran had reached agreement with the international
oil consortiums that enabled Iran to become an active parti-
cipant in the oil industry,. Control of the country's share
is managed through the National Iranian Oil Company, whose
founding was the only successful phase of the 1951 Nationali-
zation laws. The oil industry in Iran has been constantly
expanding; over half of its exports go to Japan and other
parts of Asia, as well as Western Europe. Iran's continued
success at industrialization, modernization and the ability
to increase the standards of the country's socioeconomic
structure are all hinged on the amount of oil revenues
k*5
-^"Boumedienne States Arab Oil Position," Middle East
Monitor , v. ^, no. 23, p. 5-6, 15 December 197^
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Iran is now into the fifth Seven-Year Plan for economic
development, which is still highly dependent on oil revenues,
even though each succeeding plan tries to reduce economic
dependence on oil income
„
As a strong Western Ally, Iran can foresee a constant
demanding market for the oil supplies no matter what the
Arab oil producers should decide to do. Since Iran is not
torn by movements of Pan-Arabism that could conflict with
the country's own national identity and interests, this
independent state is free to either support other Arab
nations or to "go it alone" on oil matters, such as it did
during the oil embargoes by continuing to supply oil to
Israel. Iran wields enough power to be the main contender
against Saudi Arabia for not only domination of all facets
of the oil industry, but outright leadership in the Persian
Gulf region. As will be seen in the chapter on OPEC, this
country is a major factor to be dealt with on all issues,
and without favorable ties the Arab world could lose out in
any attempt to employ the oil weapon a
Additionally, three non oil producing Arab nations that
must be reckoned with are Egypt, Syria and Lebanon,, Egypt
and Syria are at the heart of the Middle East conflict be-
tween the Arab world and Israel, and this conflict is one of
the main political factors affecting any oil policy. The
fighting between Egypt and Israel in both 19^7 and 1973 re-
sulted in the two oil embargos In effect, these embargos
were called for by Egypt as a request for support from its
ko

Arab brethren and in retaliation for Western support of
Israelo Egypt is also important in relations with its Arab
neighbors relative to the oil market because of the country's
control of the Suez Canal.
The two previous closures not only forced Western con-
sumers to seek alternative means of obtaining oil, but
forced the Arab states to stop and consider just how to get
their oil to the demanding markets The importance of good
relations with Syria and Lebanon and the requirement for due
consideration of their attitudes when policies are decided
upon lie in the area of pipelines. A large supply of oil
from major Middle East Arab oil fields, mainly Iraq and
Saudi Arabia, must pass through pipelines within the borders
of these countries prior to loading on ships in Mediterranean
ports for transport to market.
As Syria has already demonstrated, the oil flow can be
stopped or slowed down without the Arab producers even
contemplating embargo actions. Syria and Lebanon have also
had a strong impact in determining the prices of Iraqi oil,
agreements which the Iraqi government formerly described as
"blackmail under duress." Iraq has recently, however, com-
pleted plans for its own pipeline, the Fao-Haditha, which
will put Iraq in position to exert its own pressure by
threatening to cancel or reduce the flow of oil through the
old pipelines o All these factors make it clear why even
LA
"Iraq-Syria-Lebanon: The Strategic Pipelines," An -
Nahar Arab Report , v 7i no. 1, p„ 2, 5 January 19?6.

some of the non oil producing Arab nations can influence
Arab oil policy decisions.
No mention has been made thus far concerning the United
Arab Emirates. This unified "conglomerate" of small shiek-
doms produces a fair amount of oil. In 197^ they produced
83.3 million metric tons which amount to approximately 10%
hi
of the total Arab oil production for that year. ' However,
they are highly conservative and usually follow the lead of
Saudi Arabia on major issues. It is a rare occurrance for
the group to stand on its own for policy actions. The
largest, Abu Dhabi, has recently run into difficulty over
the decrease in oil demand. The country has not only had
to reduce production but has also had to abandon plans for
nationalization of its oil industry, since the oil companies
are still needed not only to provide the technology in
managing the markets but also to sell the bulk of the oil
produced. Oil and Industry Minister for the United Arab
Emirates, Ma'ni Utayba, has viewed Abu Dhabi's problem as
an example of "political pressure" by the oil companies to
try to influence prices. Supposedly, the UAE was chosen for
this action because of its enormous wealth, most of which is
committed to foreign aid. Like the others, Abu Dhabi has
' Arab Report and Record , Issue 1, p. 67, 1-15 January
1975.
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now been forced into the position of learning to program
production levels and conserve its petroleum resources.
C. PAST AND PRESENT INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE ARAB
OIL COUNTRIES
When interrelationships involving oil and the oil pro-
ducers are considered, there are four main areas that should
be highlighted: oil revenue spending, crises actions, OPEC,
and power plays. Oil revenue spending mainly in the form
of economic aid, and power plays will be summarized briefly
while interactions in past crisis actions, such as embargos
,
will be analyzed in depth. These are important since past
embargos can be viewed as the foundation for determining
the future. The interrelationships of the various Arab States
as members of OPEC and OAPEC will be considered in the follow-
ing chapter because these organizations are most likely the
backbone for any form of joint policy or for possible
evolution of certain forms of disunity.
1. Spending the Oil Revenues
The various oil producing nations spend their reve-
nues in two major ways s internal development and external
financial aid. In addition, some countries invest in foreign
enterprises. Spending money for growth and development has
served to increase the countries' standards of living, with
resultant benefits to industrialization, education and
agriculture. There is not much interaction between nations
in this area that could influence oil policy unless the point
of inequality of oil revenues is brought into the picture.
^3

This inequality, as will be shown in the next chapter, has
led some nations to seek a production allocation level among
OPEC members in order that all nations might obtain their
fair share of oil revenues relative to the amount of oil
production capability of each particular country.
The other main area of spending that does lead to
some interplay among nations is the various forms of finan-
cial aid. The Arab nations, similarly to the United States,
are very generous with their wealth. There are many programs,
both joint and individual, that supply funds for economic
assistance to the many underdeveloped Third World countries.
Among these are OPEC sponsored plans of loans or contribu-
tions to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
and some individual country aid programs, such as the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency, the Kuwayt Fund for Arab Economic
Development, and revenue funds set up by Iran, Libya, and
the United Arab Emirates.
Some additional funding programs established jointly
by two or more participating states include the Islamic Bank
to aid Moslem Countries, the Arab Bank for Africa and Spe-
cial Arab Fund for Africa, and the Aid Bangladesh Consortium. 7
These various programs help to serve as a unifying factor
among the Third World nations, but quite possibly could lead
to problems if a "fair share" is not distributed. A poten-
tial problem area, especially for the OPEC sponsored programs,
7Wariavwalla , B. , "The Energy Crisis, The Developing
World and Strategy," Adelphi Papers No. 115: The Middle East
and the International Security System , p. 33-3^» Inter-
national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975

is related to the declining oil revenue surplus that could
affect just how much an individual country might wish to
contribute versus what the others feel should be contributed.
The major oil producers have also spent a fair
amount of money in assisting to rebuild the war torn nations
following the two major Middle East wars. Additionally,
Saudi Arabia aided Egypt following closure of the Suez Canal,
an event that had a major impact on that country's economy
due to loss of revenue from shipping tolls. Interrelation-
ships in the area of spending between the haves and have
nots could lead to problems in a future crisis situation.
Since most of the countries involved here are members of
OAPEC , it would seem that some of the recent joint ventures
of this organization, for example, the Arab Shipbuilding
and Repair Yard Company, the Arab Petroleum Investment Com-
pany, and the Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company,
are attempts to maintain solidarity.
2 o Crisis Situations Involving the Arab Oil Producers
There have been several crisis situations since
development of the oil industry began, involving such con-
cepts as prices, nationalization, and employment of the oil
weapon. Pricing problems will be dealt with in the following
chapter on OPEC and nationalization problems have already
been mentioned. This section will deal with the two employ-
ments of the oil weapon--the embargos of I967 and 1973.
^°"0APEC: Projects Started," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 6,
noo 1, p. 3» 6 January 1975.
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Understanding the impact of these actions is important since
one of the three options open to the Arabs, should they wish
to adopt any future strategies involving use of their oil
as a political tool, is embargo, the other alternatives
being prices and production levels „ A brief resume of the
two embargos will be presented first to be followed by a
comparison of the similarities and impacts which took place
that could be used to assist in forecasting a new embargo,
a. The I967 Oil Embargo
The Arab Oil embargo of 19^7 came about basic-
ally due to Nasser's proclamation of k June that the United
States and Great Britain were aiding Israel in the attack
on Egypt and Jordan. Iraq then called a conference in
Baghdad of all Arab oil producing countries. The aim of the
conference was to get a consensus to withhold oil from any
country backing aggression against an Arab state. Attendees
at the conference were the oil producers Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwayt, Algeria, UAR, Bahrain, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi. Also
in attendence were Lebanon and Syria since they controlled
oil pipelines. The conference unanimously decided on 5 June
to suspend the flow of Arab oil and to prevent both direct
and indirect shipments to any state which committed or
supported an aggression against another Arab nation or any
Arab territory. The participants also appealed to Iran to
51take measures to prevent Persian oil from reaching Israel. •'




The actual embargo actions took place on 6 June
when Iraq suspended pumping, Kuwayt banned oil exports going
to the United States and Britain, Syria closed all pipelines
from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon banned loading of
oil on any ships, no matter what flag was carried, at the
Iraq and Saudi pipeline terminals. Algeria not only banned
oil exports but also placed all U.S. and British companies
under state controlo On the seventh of June Saudi Arabia
announced that oil supplies were being cut off to supporters
of Israel and all exports ceased from Libya, Bahrain and
Qatar as well. Libya, however, did not ban shipments to
West Germany, which were large enough to be diverted to the
United Kingdom.
The oil embargo was officially lifted at the
Khartoum conference on August 29, 1967. However, most
countries by then had resumed production with only an embargo
on tankers destined to the United States or Great Britain.
Saudi Arabia resumed Aramco operations on 13 June, Kuwayt
and Iraq on 14 June, and Libya had resume operations on
7 June. Most states had not been enthusiastic about an ex-
port embargo so that the lifting of it was not unexpected.
The Arab producers had reached a more realistic and moderate
view. Their new approach was based on the idea that "oil
could be put to the best use as a positive weapon, providing
53








The Cairo radio later described the percentage of oil pro-
duction stopped by the Arab countries during the oil embargo
as follows: Libya, 79^; Saudi Arabia and Kuwayt, 37?6;
Algeria, 57%', and Qatar, ?.6^ -^
Broadcasts from various countries showed that
the Arabs were now aware of the "oil weapon,," However, they
also became painfully aware of how weak and ununited OPEC
was, and how much they themselves suffered economic damage
as a result of their actions. Various budgets had to be
cut and development plans curtailed. Furthermore, the non-
Arab OPEC nations such as Venezuela and Iran had increased
production and reaped in the profits. The boycott had been
ineffective in hurting the supporters of aggression and had
only really hurt the boycotters, themselves. Next time the
oil weapon would have to be employed more judiciously,
b. The 1973 Oil Embargo
Unlike the hastily devised 1967 oil embargo just
summarized, the 1973 embargo, evolving as a result of actions
during the October War, was a well organized and carefully
planned scheme, which made a lasting impact on the Western
nations and world economy . The 1973 employment of the oil
v/eapon was a two step process, only one of which could be
linked directly to the fourth Arab-Israel conflict. Both
stages followed conclusion of the actual fighting, unlike




the previous embargo, which denotes a care full and well
structured attempt at retaliation. The first action was the
decision on October 16, 1973 , "by six Gulf oil producing
states, Abu Dhabi, Iraq, Kuwayt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and
Iran, to unilaterily raise prices. This action was not
connected with the war itself and was quickly overshadowed
by succeeding events. J However, the increase was event-
ually adopted by the rest of OPEC countries so that the
long range and far reaching effect never became terminated.
The main stage of the crisis was the quick de-
cision by Arab oil producers, acting in concert under the
structure of OAPEC , 2^ hours later to restrict production
levels to 25% of the amount produced in September. The
cutback was to remain in effect until Israel withdrew from
Arab territories occupied since 1967. A selective total
embargo against the United States and Holland for their
support of Israel was also levied. Other Western nations
suffering from the reduced production levels sought to
establish either friendship with the Arabs, or tried to
maintain a demonstrated neutrality towards the conflict.
Western Europe was hurt indirectly by Holland's
embargo since the dutch port of Rotterdam acts as a pipeline
^"Oil Consumers Prepare as Prices Rise and Supplies are
Cut," Middle East Economic Digest , v. 17, no. ^3 > p» 1238,
26 October 1973.
-^
"Arab Oil Policy: A First Comment," An-Nahar Arab
Report
,
v ^, no. ^7, p. 1. 19 November 1973»
49

terminal for much of the crude oil destined for this area.
Japan was told to sever all ties with Israel or face an
embargo instead of just a production cutback. Following
the Algerian Summit Conference on November 29, 1973, the
cutbacks were eventually lessened for Europe with plans made
for shipments direct to countries losing supplies as a re-
sult of the embargo on Holland
,
The European states, along with Japan and the
Philippines, could now enjoy a "favored nation" status and
would not suffer any further reduction in oil supplies,
Japan joined this group on November 22, when a policy
statement "calling on Israel to withdraw from all Arab terri-
tory occupied in the 19&7 war a^1^ asking for the recognition
of and respect for 'the legitimate rights of the Palestin-
ian people' in accordance with the United Nations charter"
57
was issued. ' The conference also extended the selective
embargo to include South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal,
and threatened embargoes on any country reexporting to an
embargoed nation. The production cutbacks caused austerity
plans to be implemented throughout the world. Many of the
plans would remain in effect for an indefinite time period,
probably as a result of a Kuwayti oil company consultant's
^
'"Japanese Statement Brings Arab Oil Reward," Middle
East Economic Digest , v. 17, no. ^8, p. 1390, 30 November
1973.
-^
"Arab Oil Embargo: Worse to Come?" An-Nahar Arab
Report , v. k, no. 50, p. 1-2, 10 December 1973-
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warning that all producers would probably continue to im-
pose some sort of limitations as a means of conserving
59reserves -^ 7
Two important factors make this employment of
the oil weapon unique. First, though the main thrust was
an all-Arab action, one of the main Arab oil producing na-
tions did not participate. Iraq chose not to join the
"otherwise unanimous policy" of reduced production and in
fact actually raised its oil output . Iraq was not against
using oil as a political weapon, having urged such measures
on more than one occasion. However, the country "refused
to be party to the general Arab cutback" because it had
61
sought much stronger measures against the United States.
The Iraqi plan, reflecting the conviction that the United
States is a principal enemy, involved nationalization of
American oil interests, withdrawal of Arab deposits from
American banks and a break off of all diplomatic and econo-
62
mic relations with the United States.
In contrast to this, many observers believed
that the real Iraqi position for not participating was based
^"Oil Cutbacks Could Remain After the War," Middle
East Economic Digest, v. 17, no. 46, p. 1334, 16 November
1973o
"Iraq: A Lonely Rider," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 4,
no. 53. p. If 31 December 1973»
"Arab Oil: A Gesture of Good Will," An-Nahar Arab
Report , v. 4, no. 48, p 1, 26 November 1973.
62
"Iraq: A Lonely Rider," op. cit. , p 1.
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on a grievance with the Arab combatants over not being con-
sulted during the actual phases of the war, as well as the
pressing financial requirements for oil revenues to complete
urgent development work. J This second position seems to
merit more credibility. In any event the fact that Iraq,
in addition to Iran, did not support the Arab actions points
out the difficulty of maintaining a solid front on policy
matters.
The other important point is that though this
action seemed to come as a shock, the Western world had been
warned of the impending possibility for many months prece-
ding actual implementation. Egypt, unable to dislodge
Israel through military force, had become an ardent advocate
of the oil weapon and sought Arab assistance in an economic
war. On June 2, 1973 > "the Saudi foreign minister, Omar
Saggaf, had declared: "The Arabs are ready to freeze the
levels of deliveries of crude oil to countries which sup-
port Israel.. odo not see any justification for increasing
output for the benefit of states which support an expanion-
6kist and racist state." Even King Faysal voiced the atti-
tude in August that a freeze or reduction of oil production
levels would be ordered if the United States did not modify
its pro-Israeli policies. These warnings, however, went





"Arab Oil: The Saudi Stand-1," An-Nahar Arab Re-port ,
v. k, no. 31, p. 2, 2k September 1973°
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pass, the reductions would be in stages of gradual restric-
tion of production growth rates, none of which could be
implemented before early 197^„ * The world was unprepared
for the massive sudden production cutbacks that followed
as an aftermath of the war,
c. Some Similarities
A few comparisons between the two oil weapon
embargos may now be drawn. Both resulted from support for
Arab nations involved in conflicts , nations that are not oil
producers, and both were against aggressive supporters of
Israel. This fact shows the strength of feelings rela-
tive to Arab unity and mutual support,, The first embargo
was unorganized and relatively ineffectual. However, the
action revealed to the Arab nations the potential value of
an organized employment and thus enabled them to be more
than ready for the second, highly successful, embargo. Both
events showed some disunity due to lack of participation
by all Arab nations, which becomes more relevant as today's
reduced world oil demand makes the market more competitive.
Finally, unless Iran can be brought into concert with the
Arabs, the Western world will always have an ally for filling
the gap of supply interruptions, thus lessening the effect
of any Arab embargo action. This "assistance," however,
when used will probably become very expensive.
*"Arab Oil: The Saudi Stand-2," An-Nahar Arab Report ,
v, k, no. *K), p. 1, 9 October 1973.
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A final type of interrelationship between oil
producing nations that should be considered is inter-Arab
politics o Various oil countries have vied at one time or
another for leadership among the Arab world, within the
Middle Eastern region, or within the structure of OPEC. A
few of these will now be discussed to show how they could
influence oil policies.
3. Inter-Arab Politics
The main oil producing nations involved in Arab
power politics are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, and Algeria.
The Saudi Arabian steadfast support for the 1973 oil embargo
actions and warnings prior to actual implementation quite
possibly resulted from a struggle between Libya and that
country for leadership of the Arab world. Libyan President
Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, has pursued the personal ambition of
becoming the future leader of the Arab world. The Saudi
conviction maintains that "Arab unity must be centered on
Saudi Arabia as the guardian and temporal head of Islam."
Consequently, King Faysal was forced in 1973 to lessen the
relationship with the United States in favor of a stronger
and more tangible support of the Arab cause. By doing this
Egypt would continue to seek its main economic and political
support from Saudi Arabia instead of Libya.
Another potential leader is Iran. This country has





created "by the British withdrawal, by seeking various secu-
rity arrangements and alliance structures amongst the Arab
states. Prospects in this area that would put Iran in a
leadership position are slim because of the many Arab issues
involvedo Saudi Arabia and Iran are usually at opposite
poles in the "Arab Cold War" and various pressures from
Egypt and the other more revolutionary states continually
keep a wedge driven between these two nations. Each nation
is powerful in its own right, but neither is strong enough
to suppress the other, and the diverse attitudes preclude
any joint role„ Nevertheless, Iran, as one of the principal
Gulf powers, continues to aspire to a leadership role in
partnership with the other states „ '
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are at odds for leader-
ship among the oil producing members of OPEC. Their roles
are challenged here by Libya and Algeria, Algeria seeks
leadership of the underdeveloped Third World countries as a
unified body and uses their support in asserting its posi-
tion. Power struggles within this organization are a deter-
mining factor on just whose policy decisions are adopted.
Though much of this will be brought out in the next chapter,
it is important to note that not all interactions by coun-
tries seeking some sort of leadership role are directly
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nations, quite possibly oil policies may be affected should
any major producer decide to assert its position and take
over or withdraw from the group when it feels powerful
enough to survive on its own.
D . SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed many facets concerning the
attitudes and actions of the Middle Eastern oil producing
states. All are relevant when any type of oil policy or
political employment of the oil weapon is to be focused upon.
How the countries are able to manage their own oil indus-
tries will determine their ability to assert independence
in the oil market „ The attitudes of other neighboring Arab
states will help decide such state policies as price, ship-
ment levels, etc. Their individual strengths will aid in
resolving just whose ideas carry the most weight. Finally,
knowledge of how they spend their money is a prerequisite
for determining the amount of revenues required, and a
comprehension of how they reacted together in past uses of
oil weapon tactics will assist in predicting similar actions
in the future. The next chapter on OPEC will deal with the




III. ANALYSIS OF OPEC
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the roles that the
four major Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwayt and Libya)
play within it. The analysis will concentrate mainly in the
areas of viewpoints held by the countries considered, major
decisions since the Arab-Israeli War of 19^7, and pricing
policies, with a brief treatment of the parallel group OAPEC
(Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries), Prior
to looking at the individual countries and their relation-
ships within OPEC, some background information on the history
and functions of the Organization will be presented, followed
by an analysis of the policy and price decisions for recent
years
.
A. A BRIEF BACKGROUND STATEMENT ON OPEC
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was
chartered on September 1^, i960, during a meeting between
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwayt, Iran and Venezuela. At this
time the five nations held 67$ of world reserves of petro-
leum, accounted for 38% of the total world production of
petroleum, and furnished nearly 90$ of the oil in inter-
national trade. In particular, in order to indicate the
gravity of the task that OPEC had set itself — that of
forming a united front vis-a-vis the major oil companies —
it should be added that these companies, taken together,
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produced just over 50% of the total volume of crude oil
6ft
extracted in the whole world
„
The initial thoughts for creating an intergovernmental
organization surfaced during the first Arab Petroleum Con-
gress, held April, 1959 > in Cairo, with Iran and Venezuela
as invited observers. This Congress looked at problems
concerning Arab national companies and Arab participation
in the oil enterprise. Slowly, though, during private talks
representatives began thinking of an organization in which
all oil producing countries would participate. The main
areas of concern were prices and company control. OPEC was
created as a direct result of an oil price reduction. Prior
to 1950, the oil companies and host governments operated on
a 50-50 principle for sharing profits that benefited both
sides due to tax liabilities and credits. During the late
50s the main issue of posted prices arose , These prices
were used to compute profits and determine tax liabilities
,
Under the 50-50 plan nothing changed until 1957 when a less
than satisfactory market situation forced the oil companies
to start reducing posted prices d Since this action actually
reduced country revenues, governments wanted to participate
in any future decisions concerning prices as well as to
renegotiate the present change. The reductions of 1959 and




i960 forced the countries to unite and demand stable prices
and a return to the pre-1960 price level.
"
OPEC's first resolution reveals the hard-core basis for
creation of the Organization:
"That members can no longer remain indifferent to the
attitude heretofore adopted by the oil companies in
effecting price modifications; that members shall
demand that oil companies maintain their prices steady
and free from all unnecessary fluctuations ; that members
shall endeavor, by all means available to them, to
restore present prices to the levels prevailing before




cations, the said companies shall enter into consulta-
tion with the member... to fully explain the circum-
stances. . . "70
The principal aim of OPEC, as stated previously in the
Introduction, was coordination and unification of the petro-
leum prices. The organization also sought to "devise ways
and means of ensuring the stabilization of prices in inter-
national crude-oil markets with a view of eliminating harmful
and unnecessary fluctuations" and to give due regard to
(a) protecting interests of producing nations, (b) securing
a steady income to producing countries, (c) maintaining an
efficient, economic and regular supply of oil to consumers,
and (d) enabling petroleum industry investors to realize
71
a fair return on their capital,,
Headquartered in Geneva, membership in OPEC now numbers
thirteen; the five founders plus Algeria, Ecuador, Qatar,
^Schurr, S., and others, op. cit. , p. 120-123.
' Rouhani, P., op. cit. , p. 78.
' Schurr, S., and others, 00. cit. , p. 123.
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Indonesia, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria and the
Republic of Gabon. The structure of the Organization con-
sists of the following six functioning units: the Conference,
the supreme authority which meets twice yearly and consists
of delegations from each country; the Consultative meeting,
which convenes at any time between the Conferences to
examine any questions; the Board of Governors, with one
representative from each country; the Secretariat, which is
seated permanently for organization and administration; the
Economic Commission, which examines world petroleum prices
on a continuing basis; and the Coordination Committee of
National Companies, which was established to coordinate the




B. MAJOR OPEC DECISIONS AND PRICING POLICIES
OPEC mainly concerns itself with decisions regarding oil
production and pricing with respect to the international
markets. The other major type of decision that could be
considered is employment of the oil weapon, i.e., the embar-
go during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. However, an embargo
decision will not be considered here, since it usually does
not reflect concurrence by all members; and it has previously
been discussed in detail. The major decisions dealt with
here go back as far as 1970; these are sufficient to permit
an analysis of OPEC decision-making patterns.
' Rouhani, F. , op. cit. , p. 121-128.
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OPEC's main objectives can be categorized into two areas:
The first is stabilization of petroleum prices in such a way
that members may reap maximum economic benefits for oil ex-
ports both in terms of balance of payments and gross national
product. Additionally, members are also aware of the impor-
tance of diversifying their economic activities through "oil-
based or oil-sponsored industrialization, and direct and
active participation of national agencies in the ownership
and management of various stages of the domestic and inter-
national oil industry." The second is achieving the "elimi-
nation, reduction, or at least the preclusion of further
increases in trade restrictions and barriers," and concern
about "fiscal discrimination against import and consumption
73
of OPEC area oil and derived products," [J
OPEC adopted five main resolutions between i960 and
1962. Principal resolution #^ is directly related to the
pricing standards they use today. When this resolution was
adopted their main concern was posted prices that were
approximately 13 cents per barrel lower than previous lowest
prices set in July, 1953 • Since the oil industry amounts to
a public utility, the countries could no longer remain in-
different to the determination of prices, and their aim was
for each country to negotiate prices with its own respective
companies to at least restore the pre-1960 level. If
73^Mikdashi, Z., The Community of Oil Exporting Countries
,
p. 50, Cornell University Press, 1972.
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agreement could not be reached, they would unite and take
any steps deemed appropriate. The formula finally adopted
by OPEC for price determination reflected their desire that
price structure take into account the needs and interests
of both producers and consumers in terms of severe fluctua-
tion, predictability of change compensation for increases in
manufactured goods, producing capacity, and consistence
within various exporting countries
.
The Organization has maintained this idea, even though
methods of implementation have varied, since they have no
wish to create a monster that would affect world economic
balance and/or country development" plans on a constantly
shifting basis o In April, ±966, the adoption of a resolu-
tion for basing computation of taxes and royalties, that
were payable to the host countries, on posted prices or
reference prices became applicable to all existing and future
oil agreements,, This was OPEC's first significant
resolution on price structure and served to stabilize host
country revenues and to create a bottom limit for realized
prices. Since that time OPEC has met to consider and change
the basic reference price, but has not altered the basic aims
related to world economy (as a group, individual countries
often have individual goals )„
OPEC did not really become recognized or successful in
accomplishing the objectives which led to its creation until
7^
' Rouhani , F. , op. cit. , p. 208.
62

the Twenty-first Conference of December, 1970. This con-
ference culminated a crisis year in which the new Libyan
government had raised the posted price and tax rate and
started a trend throughout the oil-producing countries, but
not a unified stand. At this time, Libya was the most
prominent oil exporter and thus in a powerful bargaining
situation: other Arab nations were recovering from the I967
war conditions that had affected their shipment and pro-
duction levels. ^ At the conference OPEC resolved to
establish 55% as the minimum rate of taxation on oil com-
panies, to eliminate all existing disparities in posted
prices on the basis of the highest applicable (after account-
ing for differences in gravity and geography) , to establish
a uniform increase to reflect market conditions and to adopt
76
a new system for adjusting the gravity differential. ' The
Tehran Agreement of February 15, 1971i averted a proposed
embargo should an acceptable pricing agreement not be reached
and established an immediate increase of 35 cents per barrel
in the posted price of all crude oils This agreement also
promised over-all stability for a five year period. The
Tripoli Agreement of March 20, 1971. between Libya, Algeria,
Saudi Arabia and Iraq, gave Libya higher prices than the
Tehran agreement to satisfy that country's interests. The








agreements that followed proved to the world that a shift of
power from the international oil companies to the governments
of the oil producing countries had taken place. It was a
seller's market now instead of a buyers market.
Since the early 19?0 , s, OPEC has had difficulty in
agreeing on the price of oil, and relationships with the oil
companies has been fairly tenuous. In January, 1972, OPEC
concluded an agreement granting an immediate increase of
8.^9$ in crude oil prices, to compensate for dollar deval-
uation, over and above the increment reached in Tehran. At
this point consumers were having to reevaluate their demand
and producers were reevaluating production levels. This
new increase resulted from negotiations by Arab countries.
While it confirmed OPEC solidarity, the change could also
seriously affect output consumption for countries like
Venezuela, who had just lowered production levels in order
to maintain a steady flow.
'
In 1973 the Arabs states employed their "oil weapon" by
placing an embargo on Western states who supported Israel
in the October War. This action had been previously dis-
cussed and was not an OPEC action. However, during this
time frame OPEC did act to raise posted prices both in
October and December,, They claimed their actions were not
''Rifai, To, The Pricing of Crude Oil Economic and
Strategic Guidelines for an International Policy , p. 263-276,
Praeger Publishers, 1975.
'""OPEC: Arab Role Reassessed," An-Nahar Arab Report ,
v 3. no. 5. Po 1. 31 January 1972.
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a consequence of the War but were a means of bringing oil
prices in proportion to the minimum cost of extracting energy
from other sources. The era of cheap oil had ended. ° The
December price of $11.65 per barrel actually resulted from
an October decision of six Gulf oil exporters to set prices
in order to insure that posted prices for the future are
maintained at a constant kQffo above realized prices. Since
other nations followed suit, the Organization had to make it
an official stand. It was at this point that OPEC also adopted
a new scheme for defining prices „ In this case, their plans
would become a means to ensure freedom for exporting states
to modify prices, and to establish a clear relationship
between posted prices and realized profits Indications of
the growing cohesion and power of OPEC was becoming more
80
relevent with each successive conference decision. As one
organization spokesman stated following the October decision,
81
"the governments now determine prices."
The year 197^ marked the real beginning of constant de-
mand for price increases by members despite the five year
stabilization of oil prices agreed upon at the beginning of
the decade. In March at the Beirut meeting, the members
expressed the need for full compensation as a result of the
79i. pec Raises Oil Prices Again," Arab Report and Record ,
Issue 2^, p. 59, 16 December 1973.
"OPEC: Policy Confirmed," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. ^,
no. 60, p. 2, 10 December 1973.
"Oil Consumers Prepare as Prices Rise and Supplies are
Cut," Middle East Economic Digest, p„ 1238, 26 October 1973.
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dollar devaluation. They tempered their resolve by saying
that this was not a demand for higher prices but a desire
for a share of the greater profits that companies could now
82
make as a result of the devaluation. Since the meeting in
April with Western oil companies produced no mutual agreement,
OPEC issued an ultimatum giving the companies ten days to
put forth new offers to compensate for the dollar devaluation. ^
Talks were still deadlocked at the May meeting in Tri-
poli and Geneva, but at a meeting in Quito, Ecuador, on
1 June, OPEC agreed to freeze prices at $11.65 per barrel
for three months, but they would raise the royalties that
oil companies pay by 2fo This meeting showed a marked con-
flict emerging between Saudi Arabia, who had consistently
sought to keep prices stable or lower, and those countries
wishing to increase prices. Saudi Arabia threatened to put
three million barrels per day on the market at a reduced
price if the meeting tried to increase taxes on oil exports
by more than $3«00 per barrel. This move was immediately
countered by Iran and others who threatened to decrease
production. Such conflicts are now inevitable at all
meetings, and cutting deeper each time. The tax increase
82
"OPEC Demands Higher Prices," Arab Report and Record ,
Issue 6, p 1^7, 16 March 197^»
oJmqpec Meeting: No Agreement," Arab Report and Record ,
Issue 8, p. 195, lo April 197^.
"OPEC Agrees to Freeze Prices of Oil," Arab Report and
Record , Issue 12, p. 268, 16 June 197^.
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was levied at 3»5^ though Saudi Arabia dissented in the
decision. The tax increase would raise the price of oil by
33 cents according to OPEC sources though the oil companies
figured it would be more like k6 cents. However, Saudi
Arabia complicated the unified stand and announced that it
would maintain it's existing price level.
*
By late 197^, OPEC had established a working committee
to "study and recommend a new system for long term oil
pricing." This system was to revolve around a single base
reference price for crude oil and would dispense with posted
prices and distinctions between taxes paid by companies,
buy-back prices and realized prices . The new system evolved
from a desire to link oil prices with other commodity prices
as well as reduce the oil companies huge and continually
increasing profits. Presented at the December, meeting it
provided for a minimum price for crude oil (after accounting
for freight charges and quality differentials) that would be
adjusted quarterly based on an inflation rate escalation
formula. OPEC's Secretary-General 'abd al-Rahman Khini had
previously stated the position favoring price increases:
"OPEC's countries' moderate warnings to the govern-
ments of consumer countries to control inflation have
apparently served no purpose. It is clear that freezing
our prices with inflation still galloping away would be g^
tantemount to accepting a return to the status quo ante..."
^"OPEC Raises Taxes but Holds Prices," Arab Re-port and
Record
,
Issue 17, p. 389, 1 September 197^.
"OPEC: Rational Pricing," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. k t
no. *J4, p. 1, k November 197^.
67

However, when the members finally reached a decision on
the proposal, they agreed to a single market price of $10.4-6
per barrel to be applied for a nine month period regardless
of inflation. Thus, though the change represented a large
increase of ^fo over the current price, the price would re-
main stable for nine months, instead of being reviewed and
possibly changed quarterly. ' This decision supported the
original aim to not subject world economies to uncertain
fluctuations too often.
Since prices were now stabilized until September, 1975.
the first nine months of the year reflected growing dissen-
tion in agreement among the member countries over changes
to be made, if any, at the end of the period. At the oil
minister's meeting in February, Iraq, Algeria and Kuwayt
were pushing exclusion of the dollar in pricing of oil. A
move which would have effectively increased the price of oil
to the United States, and dealt a heavy blow to the dollar's
position as an international trading currency. Strong
oo
pressure by Saudi Arabia and Iran, averted this move.
The declaration issued following the March Summit Con-
ference stressed OPEC's stand that "oil prices should be
linked to the rate of inflation and cost of manufactured
'"OPEC Adopts New Price System," Arab Report and Record ,
Issue 23, p. 568, 1 December 197^.
88
"Before the OPEC Summit: Being Reasonable But Firm,"
An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 6, no. 9, p. 1, 3 March 1975.
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goods and technology." ^ The Conference, however, was a case
study in compromises as a means of preserving unity,. The
radicals led by Algeria, Iraq and Libya called for more dras-
tic stands on price and production issues based on "real
value terms" and in response to U.S. actions, while the
conservatives led by Saudi Arabia, sought to supply as much
oil as the world needed and viewed consumers efforts to
"restrict demand and pull back prices as a natural market
response and not artificial pressure."" However, no real
decisions affecting prices were reached.
The major meeting that could affect oil prices prior to
the September deadline was in June when oil ministers faced
the important issue of determining oil price policies which
would be presented at the September Conference. These poli-
cies would determine applicable rates to become effective in
October. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, almost all the
OPEC member countries agreed that present oil prices should
be "increased in absolute value to make up for the erosion
of purchasing power of the exporters' revenues caused by
inflation and the depreciation of the dollar." Saudi Arabia
championed a freeze on prices and a reopening of the dia-
logue between oil exporters and consumers. The Saudis argued
that a new increase in oil prices would be "catastrophic"
89"0PEC Summit: Unity Before All Else," An-Nahar Arab




for the whole world. Deputy Director-General for the Saudi
Information Ministry Hassan Ben Said had expressed on 28 May
the Saudi belief that "oil prices will drop as soon as an
acceptable solution is found to the Middle East conflict. "9 1
Iran favored an increase due to loss of purchasing power.
When the meeting adjourned the only decisions made were to
reaffirm the maintenance of crude oil prices at their present
level until September, and to readjust oil prices after that,
calculating those prices on the Special Drawing Rights (SDR's)
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
No state spoke of a planned increase; rather a compen-
sation for inflation and depreciation was discussed. How-
ever, replacing the dollar with the SDR as the unit of
account in calculations would result in a significant price
increase,, The radicals, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Nigeria,
sought replacement of the dollar by the SDR to become
effective in July but Saudi Arabia insisted that this action
be held in abeyance until September since the resultant 11
92
cent increase per barrel was relatively ins ignificant 7
Iran's position was to argue for an alternative to both the
dollar and SDR; an argument based on the premise that if the
dollar improves much will be lost by calculating in SDR's,
Iranian Oil Minister Amuzegar proposed indexing oil prices
Q17
~"0PEC Conference in Gabon: Pegging the Price of Oil,"
An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 6, no. 2^, p. 2-3, 16 June 1975°
°
"OPEC Conference in Gabon: A Minimum of Progress,"
An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 6, no. 25, p 1-2, 23 June 1975.
70

against prices of a basket of goods and commodities in inter-
national trade to compensate for loss of purchasing power and
inflation. Amuzegar favored a price increase but not at the
forecasted 30$ level. Other members felt that Iran's posi-
tion was the result of U.S. pressure, and seemingly might
prove too difficult to implement; thus this plan was dis-
03
carded
The OPEC ministerial conference convened in Vienna on
September 2k, 1975 > with oil prices as the main topic and a
non-united membership. Three basic attitudes prevailed. The
first was in favor of a moderate increase in the price of
oil j this was advocated by most non-Arab states. The radi-
cal view held by Algeria, Libya, Iraq (and even Iran, to a
certain extent) demanded an increase of over 10fo claiming
that purchasing power of oil revenues had decreased over
30$. The third position, that of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
States, was to keep prices at their present level so as not
to upset world economic order; provided, however, the indus-
trialized world would take steps "toward controlling the
prices of goods it sells to the oil producers." 7
The year 1975 revealed an overall iMffo drop in oil pro-
duction on the part of Middle Eastern producers as compared
to a comparable period in 197^ • This resulted to a large
93u The wor ]_(} oil Scene: Signs of Trouble Ahead," An-
Nahar Arab Report , v. 6, no. 26, p. 1-2, 30 June 1975.
°
"OPEC Conference: Asserting Positions," An-Nahar
Arab Report , v. 6, no. 37 1 p. 1» 15 September 1975°
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extent from policies adopted by the United States and other
industrialized countries. Additionally this drop became an
incentive for producers to raise prices so that they would
be able to achieve the necessary level of imported capital
goods required for their development projects. The biggest
drop was felt by Libya (^1%), with Saudi Arabia second.
Only Iraq maintained its production level, '^ Thus when the
conference adjourned on 27 September a 10% increase in price
(to be frozen for nine months) was announced. This final
decision was viewed as a major concession to the industria-
lized nations because the oil exporters were facing pro-
jected 20% increases in the cost of imports since January,
The compromise decision had not come easily, and had followed
bitter disputes between Saudi Arabia and most other states.
Saudi Arabia refused to agree to any price above 10%
and at one point tried to limit the increase to 5%« Iran,
Iraq, Libya and Nigeria had pressed for at least a 15%
increase and Iraq advocated a 20% raise. The United Arab
Emirates and Kuwayt had proposed a compromise of 12% with
a one year price freeze, but this plan was also unacceptable
06
to the Saudi delegation. 7 Surprisingly, Algeria was the
mediator in bringing about the final compromise „ Algeria





"OPEC Increases Price of Oil by Ten Per Cent," Arab
Report and Record , Issue 18, p. 538, 16 September 1975.
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usual hardline stand on prices, but was mainly a move to
keep Saudi Arabia from withdrawing from the Organization. 7 '
In a television interview on 29 September, Iranian Interior
Minister Jashmid Amuzegar accused "Saudi Arabia and another
OPEC Moslem country of entering into an 'unholy alliance in
this holy month of Ramadan 9 to try to limit the proposed
increase to five percent,,"" Iran, did believe that the
unity of OPEC would be threatened by the withdrawal of one
member and was thus incensed at the result: the final vote
on the lOfS increase was 10 for, 2 against and one abstina-
tion. Decision was postponed on replacing the dollar with
the SDR due to the dollar's new strength on the European
market.
Following the meeting the Saudi Minister of Petroleum
and Minerals Ahmed Yamani said that he hoped to see prices
frozen until 1977 vice June, 1976 The Saudi stand was that
"any increase right now, if it does not hurt the economy of
the world will at least delay the recovery of those economies
We have a vital interest in seeing the economy of the West





9?"0PEC: The Price Goes Up," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 6,
no, 39 and ^0, p. 1, 6 October 1975»
9 8
"Minister Says Saudi Arabia Almost Left OPEC," Foreign
Broadcast Information Service - Middle East & North Africa
,
volo V, no. 192, p„ 2, 2 October 1975.
99"0il Prices Should be Frozen Until 1977," Middle East
Economic Digest, v. 19, no. ^6, p. 11, 1^ November 1975.
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The one main observation that can be made here is that
though the unity of OPEC survived, it was indeed shaken, and
to a greater degree than ever before. A new rivalry had
begun to develop between Saudi Arabia and Iran that could
have serious implications in the future. The major issues
between the two countries seem to be a struggle for OPEC
leadership and the calculating unit for oil revenues and
price differentials. If differences can not be settled
OPEC unity will be subject to dissolution every time a major
issue is at stake.
Other OPEC concerns are oil production levels, economic
aid to underdeveloped nations and embargos. Embargos have
been discussed previously and economic aid is not an issue
this paper proposes to discuss. The problems of oil pro-
duction levels are a current question, but no definitive
policies have been established as yet„ These issues pose
serious problems for OPEC's future and will be looked at in
the concluding topic of this section.,
C. THE ROLES OF THE MAJOR ARAB OIL PRODUCERS IN OPEC
After looking at the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries as a unified group, consideration will now be made
concerning particular roles within the structure of some of
the various countries — especially the four large Arab
exporters, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwayt and Libya. Since these
100
"0PEC: Issues Threaten Unity," An-Nahar Arab Report ,
v 6, no. kl, p. 2, 13 October 1975°
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countries have all been analyzed in the earlier chapter,
only their role in OPEC will be discussed. As one of the
original members of OPEC, Saudi Arabia is perhaps one of the
most conservative members. Saudi Arabia has remained the
largest producer of oil since the organization's founding.
Currently the country is trying to gain leadership of OPEC
with the biggest opposing contender Iran. As the most pro-
Western Arab nation, Saudi Arabia is not a proponent of oil
increases. The Saudi policy leans more toward consumer-
producer dialogues to settle disagreements, with prices
raised only when mutual agreements can not be reached, or
if consumers are not willing to undertake meaningful dis-
cussions concerning mutual and/or Arab problems. Since
OPEC's creation, Saudi Arabia has been a strong advocate of
policies that seek cooperation and participation of the
states and oil companies.
On September 17, 197^, Shaikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi
Arabia's Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs delivered
an address titled "A Policy for Oil Towards a New-Producer-
Consumer Relationship." In it he stressed the need for a
better relationship between exporters and importers, a
relation such that oil companies would not remain in the
middle. According to Yamani, this relationship should rest
on the availability of crude oil, prices and the recycling
of oil surplus funds. Since this non-renewable resource
constitutes the major share of a country's livelihood, the
revenues received must meet necessary requirements. But a
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build-up of surplus funds is not the answer to the problem.
Prices, revenues and production costs must maintain an
equilibrium that can only be achieved through meaningful
101
working relationships. x In late 197^ Saudi Arabia was
the only OPEC member "resolutely set against" the policy of
maintaining a single unified price for oil and in fact seemed
102to favor an overall oil price decrease.
In 1975, Saudi Arabia again did not favor the massive
price increases and in fact almost left OPEC because of
them. With the world's largest proven oil reserves, the
country could supply approximately 50% of the projected oil
demand for the remainder of the 70s, and thus in effect de-
termine whether oil supplies would be in abundance or
103
shortage Consequently, the Saudis can act alone to
affect oil prices as well as any other oil policy on which
10^+
OPEC might decide to attempt, Saudi Arabia's membership
in OPEC is important to the West as a means of keeping the
price ceiling from skyrocketing,, The country's cooperation
in OPEC and OAPEC is also important to the other members in
order to keep their oil supplies in demand. However, as far
1 01
"Saudi Arabia-U.S. : Prospects for Cooperations,"
An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 6, n. *H, p 2, 13 October 1975.
102
"Yamani: A Policy for Oil," Arab Report and Record ,
Issue 17, p. 391, 1-15 September 197IK~
10
^"Gulf Oil: Saudis Go Their Own Way," An-Nahar Arab
Report , v, 5, no. k6, p. 2, 18 November 197^.
10
^Carpenter, W.M. and Gilber, S.P., Great Power Interests
and Conflicting Objectives in the Mediterranean - Middle East
Persian Gulf Region , Stanford Research Institute, Report
No. DAAG 39-74-C-0082, p. 39 i December 197^.
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as OAPEC alone is concerned the issue is more that of Arab
Unity; and Saudi Arabia is a strong proponent of unity, and
could split with the west over this issue, Al-Yamani pro-
posed that the country would resort to anything--" expulsion
from the U.N.
, an embargo on oil, and use of our monetary
power" if Israel can not agree to an acceptable settlement
of the Middle East and Palestinian question. ^
Contrary to Saudi conservatism, Iraq is one of the more
radical Arab members of OPEC, and strong proponent of price
increases o Iraq is also, however, isolated within the
organization. It did not support the oil embargo and pro-
duction cutback of 1973 » arguing that the measure was not
practical. Oil and Minerals Minister Dr. Sa'adun Hammadi
explained this action by saying that oil could not be con-
sidered just a commodity produced and sold for economic
gain, but was a resource closely linked to the producer
state's development. This explains Iraq's current stand
since not only did Iraq profit greatly by the actions in
1973 > but continues to seek higher prices so as to have more
revenues for internal development. Iraq is not against
employment of the oil weapon, however, and would probably
support OPEC and OAPEC on these issues if they should arise.
Having an ambitious development program, it is believed that
the country today would cooperate with its OPEC partners in
10
^"Saudi Views of Oil Prices," Middle East Economic
Survey
, v, 18, no. ^5, p. 1. 29 August 1975.
"Iraq: A Lonely Rider," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. k,
no. 53, p. 1. 31 December 1973.
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any way to maintain the purchasing power of oil revenues and
continually seeks to link oil prices to a commodities index.
At present Iraq is the OPEC advocate of allocating oil sup-
plies among members so that demand may "be met while control-
ling production and programming reserves, market conditions,
etc. 10?
Considering the country's size, Kuwayt is OPEC's richest
producer on an output per capita basis. On its own initia-
tive, this country has controlled production to the extent
of banking its oil by keeping it in the ground and maintaining
an established daily output. Kuwayt is one of the moderates,
advocating prices much lower than Iraq, Algeria and Libya,
and seeking to establish compromises when disagreements
arise. Generally, Kuwayt follows the Saudi lead. Prior to
the October, 1975 $ increase the Kuwayt Minister of Finance
Mr. *abd al-Rahman al-'Ataghi stated that oil price stability
depended on effective producer-consumer dialogues, and that
Kuwayt only wanted to recover the loss of purchasing power
resulting from the present freeze,, Additionally, Kuwayt
seeks establishment of prices on a yearly basis to help
keep world economic order. Kuwayt' s main position on
prices within the Organization is to support any decisions
that will safeguard the unity of OPEC since oil pricing is
10?Seymour, I., "Iraqi Oil Policy in Focus," Middle East
Economic Survey , v. 28, no. 35» P° 2, 20 June 1975°





economical not political. The Kuwayt government feels this
way due to the belief that oil prices fall within the control
of an international organization that has "both Arab and non-
Arab members and can never hope to form a unified political
viewpoint. '
The other big Arab member of OPEC is Libya. This country
started out in both OPEC and OAPEC as a conservative, but
with its change in government has become more militant al-
though not to the extent of Algeria. Libya supports the
idea of coordinating production and advocates any action
necessary to establish a realistic and flexible system for
determining quality and freight differentials. Libya suffers
the heaviest losses in the area of crude oil differentials
and is, therefore, the strongest proponent of a system
applicable to all OPEC members.
Other countries affecting the OPEC organization are
Algeria and Iran. Algeria is Arab and highly radical, even
though it compromised goals and joined Saudi Arabia last
October in order to preserve OPEC unity. However, the coun-
try can not be counted on to continue similar actions unless
these are felt to be in its own best interests. Iran, on
the other hand, is non-Arab. As the second largest producer
behind Saudi Arabia, this country is also vying for leadership
of the organization. Additional conflicts beyond that of
10%iddle East Economic Survey , v 28, no. ^7 , Supple-
ment, p. 2, 12 September 1975.
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October could split up the structure irreparably. OPEC
needs Iran's cooperation as much as it needs Saudi Arabia's,
However, unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran seems to put domestic
concerns as first priority.
Though each country has its own particular role to play
in the organization, each "would sacrifice a measure of
economic gain for the sake of a fuller control of their
economies" in such a way as to negate the presence of "power-
110ful expatriate economic interests." Thus any OPEC poli-
cies along this line of reasoning would get top priority
and full support . How the countries could affect the future
of OPEC is analyzed in the conclusion,, Before turning to
that, the structure of the parallel organization OAPEC will
be reviewed
o
D. THE ORGANIZATION OF ARAB PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES
OAPEC was formed on January 9> 19^8, by the governments
of the three largest Arab oil exporting countries, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwayt, and Libya. OAPEC 's creation cemented an
alliance between three more or less politically homogenous
states with conservative leanings and marked a parting from
Arab revolutionary states, Iraq and Algeria, within the
OPEC organization,, Major differences among the OPEC members
had existed since its founding due to domestic, regional, or
international problems that, though not necessarily oil
110Mikdashi, op. cit. , p. 200
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related, plagued solidarity. The real problem became real-
ized during the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli War when an oil
embargo was attempted, called by some the "petroleum defense
line .
"
The embargo has been previously discussed and should be
remembered as a hasty decision based on political pressures
without considerations of economics „ The Saudi Minister of
Petroleum and Mineral Resources summed it all up with his
comment that the embargo decision "hurt the Arabs themselves
more than anyone else, and the only ones to gain any benefit
from it were the non-Arab (oil) producers." For instance,
the main target of the embargo, the United States, was
enjoying greater revenues from the resultant price increases
on petroleum products and maintaining oil supplies from other
sources Also, other OPEC suppliers were making handsome
profits by continuing to supply oil to embargoed countries.
Following failure of the selective embargo, the Arab Minis-
ters of Finance, Economy and Oil held a conference to deter-
mine a new course of action. Two diametrically opposed
solutions were presented. The first supported by Iraq and
Algeria involved a three month stoppage of all Arab oil
exports to deplete European oil stocks, even though some
Arab governments would suffer severe domestic problems. The
second solution, favored by Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt and Libya,
offered a policy that would maximize oil revenues and use
oil proceeds to aid war-torn Arab states in rebuilding. A
concensus was finally reached and oil flowed. However, the
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latter group, having suffered heavily in the oil embargo,
"thought it in their best interests to coordinate their
policies outside the Arab League in order to exclude other
Arab states from their affairs." 111 These formed OAPEC , an
organization designed as a substitute for various oil
activities of the Arab League.
Membership in OAPEC now numbers nine: Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Kuwayt, Libya, Algeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates,
Syria and Egypt. Any Arab nation is eligible for OAPEC
membership if petroleum constitutes the principle and basic
source of its income. While OPEC's main objective is stabi-
lization of prices, OAPEC is organized as a partnership
involving all phases of the oil industry; so that member
states are able to maintain the oil sector within the frame-
work of their national economy instead of having it remain
112
the external factor that it currently seems to be. Like
OPEC, OAPEC now has political differences between the con-
servative camp and the revolutionary group (Libya joined
this side in 1970 with the change in government) that
threaten its solidarity. However, both groups "have in
common the ultimate aim of unity among Arab countries," and
they also presume that "oil can be a means to political
113integration." J
nlMikdashi, op. cit. , p. 83-87 and 10^.
112Who's Who In The Arab World, ^th Edition , p. 151,
Publitec Publishers, 1975.
%ikdashi, ot). cit. , p. 90.
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The first crucial test of OAPEC solidarity and success
as a functioning unit came in October, 1973, during the
fourth Arab-Israeli conflict, when both an embargo and pro-
duction cut-back was levied. On the day following OPEC's
price increase decision, OAPEC succeeded in quickly adopting
an acceptable embargo strategy A minimum cutback was
proposed and each nation became responsible for settling on
their own rates and procedures for implementation. Thus a
solid front of reduced production and selective embargo, with
1 1 Zi,
the exception of Iraq, ensued.
The OAPEC statement issued following the Vienna Confer-
ence on March 17, 197^ » revealed that the Ministers had:
"reevaluated the results of the Arab oil measures in light
of its main objective, namely to draw the attention of the
world to the Arab cause. « o were aware of the fact that oil is
a weapon which can be utilized in a positive manner in order
to lead to results the effectiveness of which may surpass
those (results) if the oil weapon was used in a negative
115
manner." •*
OAPEC also lifted the embargo on oil supplies to the U.S.
,
though Syria and Libya did not assent to the decision, and
Algeria claimed the action provisional in nature until the
first of June. However, the most forceful part of their
1
"Arab Oil Policy: A First Comment," An-Nahar Arab
Report , v. ^, no. ^7, p. 1» 19 November 1973.
115h apeC Statement," Arab Report and Record , Issue 6,
p. 120, 16-31 March 197^.
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statement is embodied in their attitude towards Israel:
Israel alone will bear the dangerous responsibility
if the forthcoming events lead to the undertaking of
more severe oil measures, in addition to the other
various resources which the Arab world can master in
order to join the battle of destiny,,
Israel alone is to be blamed for the effects
suffered by the countries which came under the embargo
or which suffered as a result of the reduction of the
oil production, and it (Israel) remains responsible
today for the maintaining of the production of Arab oil
at the level which is below the needs of the market. H"
OAPEC , even with its conservative members, is thus more
radical than OPEC, though both are organizations based on
oil production,, OPEC is international in statue, with a
common objective, price stabilization, that can be applied
equitably throughout the world OAPEC, on the other hand,
is regional with a more narrow goal of Arab unity, to be
achieved in part through integration of the oil industry.
OAPEC 's biggest problem is that Iran, a principle oil
exporter in the region, is non-Arab, and thus ineligible
for membership. Therefore, any Arab decisions on production
cutbacks and embargos do not affect supplies from that
country unless Iran chooses to support the Arab cause,
something that seems highly unlikely, since friendly ties
between Iran and the other Arab states are tenuous at best.
Though it is doubtful for OAPEC to expect support from Iran,
the majority of oil from that nation must pass thru pipe-
lines that cross Syria, which is a member of OAPEC, and possi'




employ the oil weapon may circumvent or remove this major
obstacle.
Another factor is the problem that OAPEC presents to
OPEC due to the fact that a large percentage of countries
are members both organizations. This dual membership will
definitely have an affect on any decisions, especially
those concerning a united front. Thus, it can readily be
seen that though separate and distinct entities, OPEC and
OAPEC are complexly related
„
E. OPEC'S OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
In conclusion, the question concerning OPEC's future,
its solidarity, chances for success, and possible actions
must be analyzed on the basis of past performance as well as
future potential,, OPEC's unity has been threatened many
times since its conception. The organization did not really
become a solid and successful working body until 1970. In
1972, the solidarity that the members had struggled for was
severely threatened over the issue of nationalization of oil
companies with the two opposing sides led by Iran and Saudi
Arabia, Iran favored direct and close cooperation with oil
companies while the Saudi side sought shares in the oil
companies, Iraq, having just nationalized its oil stood in
the middle and was having difficulty marketing its product.
This split further served to highlight the rifts between
the producers, who now viewed oil as both an economic means
of growth and development and a political weapon, and the
oil companies, which still maintained vital Western interests
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How the OPEC countries should deal with oil companies has
been a major issue ever since. 117 In 1972, they compromised
with a decision of 51% participation in concessionary com-
panies to be reached by 1983; Kuwayt and Iraq dissented from
1 *t ft
the agreement. Solidarity was again threatened during the
1973 October War when some members staged a boycott and some
members profited by continuing to supply oil.
The most recent and strongest threat to OPEC unity came
in October, 1975 i over a price issue. The circumstances
involved at this time have been discussed earlier in this
chapter. At present, it seems to be touch and go as to
whether the two big OPEC producers will remain. Iran may
leave at any time and begin dealing directly with Western
nations in order to not have the interests of radical Arab
oil producers interfering with the country's specific de-
sires over prices and its many goals on how to spend revenues.
Saudi Arabia may also leave the organization at any time
should future disagreements over price increases versus
consumer-producer dialogues become more heated. The after-
math of any such pull-out is uncertain. Lower prices may
result as oil supplies are negotiated for on a direct basis
with individual suppliers. Or, less stable supplies at
higher costs may prove to be the case should consumers try
117..QPEC: End of Solidarity," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 3,
no. 3^. P. 1-2, 21 August 1972.
11
"Oil Agreement Reassessed," An-Nahar Arab Report , v. 3,
no. 50, p. 1, 11 December 1972.
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to secure a continuing supply through rash actions, 11 ^ So
far, the organization is united, but the undercurrent of a
power struggle is definitely threatening to the structure's
foundation, and would seem to result in a lessening of the
power that could be gained in any employment of the so-called
oil weapon.
Another important factor that threatens the solidarity
of OPEC, is the supply and demand of oil versus the pro-
duction rates of the various countries. At present OPEC
has only been able to control taxes and prices. The organi-
zation often considers plans for programming and allocating
but has never adopted any such policies, since members can
generally only come to agreement on prices. OPEC has only
been concerned with maximizing all revenues (or seeing that
they don't fall during any adverse market conditions) and
has never dealt with the distribution of wealth among the
various states. This wealth can vary greatly when the
differentials of quality and transport costs for the various
crude oils are considered.
For the past year, world oil demand has slackened and
production in all countries has declined. (Kuwayt is the
exception since production cutbacks were a government in-
120
stituted decision and not due to a lessening of demand.)
^Gilbert, S.P. , and others, U.S. S ecurity Interests in
The Persian Gulf Area , Stanford Research Institute, Report
no. DAKC 15-73-C-0245, p. 65, July 1973.
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"Can OPEC Hold the Line," Middle East Economic Survey ,
v. 28, no. 19, p. 1-9, 28 February 1975.
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OPEC could be strengthened should it adopt a production dis-
tribution policy among members, but a real rift could occur
if it chooses to ignore this vital path of action. As de-
mand goes down countries with large development plans and
small reserves (Algeria, Indonesia), or small production
capacities (Iraq) would definitely be hurt. Others with
large reserves and a financial cushion (Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt)
would not. The end result might be a break-up with each
country lining up its own buyers in a cutthroat competitive
style. OPEC may never have to face this problem since the
general feeling among members is that they would be worse
off alone (especially during any crisis). But, a break-up
could surface at anytime, especially so in light of the
dwindling OPEC revenue surpluses resulting from the massive
aid programs to under-developed Third World nations and aid
programs additional to each country's internal development
121program.
The final area of stress to OPEC is the possibility that
competing oil may be obtained from sources managed by Western
or Asian states (North Sea, Alaskan, Chinese); these alter-
native sources could negate its power to control prices.
The large producing countries could be forced into a balance
of payments deficit because of this should the price remain
constant; and smaller countries might have to drastically
121
"Vast Spending is Rapidly Reducing OPEC Surpluses,"




lower prices just to maintain a share of the market. 122 Con-
sequently, the issue of competing oil supplies is one area
in which OPEC agreement and control could he shattered.
The future of OPEC, therefore, hinges on many external
factors, among these are political issues, member oil poli-
cies, prices, other sources of supply, and current demand.
At the moment its future appears secure. However, within
the next decade the organization will most likely collapse
if no policies concerning production allocation and distri-
bution are implemented along with pricing policies.
IV. STRATEGIES AND IMPACT
This chapter is concerned with analyzing some of the
strategies of the Arab decision-makers relative to their
use of oil as a political weapon and the various options
that are available to them. It will also consider the
overall impact both present and future that any or all of
the possible actions might have on the Western nations and
world economy. As has been brought out earlier in this work,
the three main options are available to the Arab states
should they wish to employ their oil weapon: price fixing
and raising, reduction of production levels and embargo.
In order to determine just how and when these strategies
122Enders, T.O., "OPEC and the Industrial Countries:




will be adopted, it becomes pertinent to consider the under-
lying factors of ideology, environment and resources.
A. IDEOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES
Where ideology is concerned the overriding idea is one
of nationalism. Not nationalism of individual countries,
but nationalism as an ideal that spreads across geographic
and political boundaries to encompass an "Arab World," a
world populated by members of different races and religions.
It is a movement that encompasses a cultural and emotional
identification with a somewhat intangible philosophy known
as the "Arab Cause." Because of this strong sentiment there
is a great effort made to remove any traces of foreign in-
fluence., Relative to the oil industry this desire can be
shown to be the driving force behind the massive push to
remove all forms of control that foreign oil companies have
over the oil industries, thus ridding the countries of
imperialist influence.
Another unifying feature of Arab nationalism is the de-
sire of each country to enhance its own military economic
and social development. These countries also seek to aid
those less fortunate financially in their development, which
is another example of this nationalistic movement. The
growth and development plans require enormous amounts of
money. Thus control of oil prices to insure vast profits
and revenue reserves becomes another pressing element which
is related to nationalism.
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Besides ideology, the environment that the Arab states
operate under becomes important when evaluating their possi-
ble actions and reactions. By nature, Arab oil states are
generally very conservative. There are exceptions, however,
such as the governments of Iraq, Libya and Algeria, which
are more revolutionary. This extreme conservatism is based
in part in Islam. Islam predominates through the Arab world,
though it is not the only religion in the area. The reli-
gious factor is most obvious in countries such as Saudi
Arabia and Kuwayt, whose governments still maintain the
traditional ways of the past. The revolutionary governments
lacking this conservatism also lack the traditional regime.
The relationship between host countries and the foreign
oil companies supports the pragmatic attitudes of the Arab
oil states o The conservative countries seek participation
agreements and mutually agreeable takeovers,, On the other
hand, the non-conservative nations have opted for nationali-
zation. Pricing attitudes is another example of Arab con-
servatism or radicalism. The more conservative the state,
the less it clamors for higher prices; since conservatives
are concerned for the Western economic state as well as
their own financial status. Additionally, lower prices are
sought only by those states still holding onto ideals from
the past as a means of maintaining the socio-economic
structure currently present.
However, the increasing roles of the new middle classes
within these conservative countries, a direct outgrowth of
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the oil industry, could bring about the downfall of these
family structured regimes. The new middle classes are more
concerned with the overall Arab nationalist cause and less
bound by the family and religious ties on which the conserv-
ative rulers still depend. Challenges from this sector could
create more revolutionary states and result in the entire
Middle East becoming a more militant region in which the
values of Islam no longer can temper the overriding nation-
alist goals o Requests for higher prices would then percolate
throughout the region.
In addition to ideology and environment, resources of
the Arab oil producers are a third contributing factor in
determing what strategies and options the Arab decision-
makers have available. Resources can be defined as either
natural or industrial; and they can be considered both as
presently available or feasibly possible for development.
Resource becomes a factor that will determine the capacity
for economic development and play an important role in any
decision.
The Middle East lacks (other than oil) any other natural
resource, including water. Since most of the main Arab oil
producers are desert-oriented economies, agricultural de-
velopment has been very slow. A high percentage of oil
revenues have been used in attempting to make improvements
in irrigation facilities. Lack of water also means lack of
hydroelectric power, thus slowing down industrial development
.
The big boom in industry for these countries has been in
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construction, but even development along this line is ham-
pered by the basic rural nature still maintained by the
majority of the Arab populations.
The only commodity the Arab states can export with
assured profit, is oil. Their economies depend on oil reve-
nues, everything must be imported and oil revenues used to
maintain a balance of payments. The consequences of this
state of affairs can possibly put the Arab decision-makers
in a precarious position. As world demand for oil decreases
and internal demand for imports increases, a more favorable
bargaining position for oil consumers is likely. This is
true because these highly developed and industrialized West-
ern nations produce the commodities required by the Arab
states. Even local technological development is still highly
dependent on Western expertise and assistance.
B. THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS OF THE OIL WEAPON
In oil, the Arabs hold a political weapon that can be
employed against the majority of the world, both the demo-
cratic industrialized West and the Communist bloc. (Little
has been mentioned thus far concerning the growing importance
of Middle East oil to the Soviet Union. The Soviets in-
creasing concern over this resource has recently started to
become another factor to be dealt witho However, should the
Soviet Union decide to undergo the expensive development of
their Siberian oil fields, their requirements for importing
oil could be alleviated.) The Arab states have demonstrated
a remarkable capacity for quickly learning the most effective
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and efficient methods for employing this newest form of
"political blackmailo"
Oil can, therefore, be viewed as the deterrence which
Herman Kahn described in his book On Thermonuclear War as
Type III deterrence, or controlled deterrence. Type III
deterrence "refers to acts that are deterred because the
potential aggressor is afraid that the defender or others
will then take limited actions, military or nonmilitary,
123that will make the aggression unprofitable." J The oil
weapon has all the desirable characteristics of a successful
deterrent. It is cheap, non-accident prone, persuasive,
12*4-
mexorable, and since 1973 » somewhat frightening.
1. Price Fixing and Raising
The first strategy that the Arab oil states can
adopt as a means of utilizing oil as a political weapon is
price control. Arab states that have the controlling inter-
est in foreign oil companies have the means by which to set
and control the prices to be paid by consumers. This price
control was the basis for the creation of OPEC. Over the
past few years, especially following the October War of
1973 1 "the oil states have demonstrated the ability to set
prices as high as desired, for both personal and political
gains o
12








However, is price control still an effective alter-
native? World demand for oil as the predominating energy
source is slowly decreasing. The oil producers could be
pricing themselves right out of the market and into debt.
The debt would arise from a balance of payments deficit due
to their continual need to import military arms , industrial
products and agricultural goods . Another factor affecting
the role of price control is the possibility that the Arab-
Israeli conflict might eventually end. Though an official
declaration of price reductions on Arab oil in return for
settlement of the dispute has never been made, it could be-
come a strong Western bargaining point „ Should the Arabs
lower their prices to obtain this goal, the other non-Arab
countries would be forced to follow suit. Since the non-
Arab nations have nothing to gain, the prospect could fore-
cast a break-up of OPEC. 12 ^
The break-up of OPEC seems too drastic at this point
to be very realistic, because its demise is contrary to the
Arab desires. However, it does merit some concern, since
the Arab nations stand to gain much by the settlement of
the conflict and could well afford a price reduction if
this became necessary to achieve a settlement
The Arab states have their own goals for revenue
spending, and surpluses are not equally distributed. This
unequal distribution of wealth could conceivably force
125Rifai, T., op. cit. , p. 375-377.
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individual countries to begin juggling prices in an attempt
to obtain a larger share of the market. This action would
not only threaten OPEC unity, but it would totally destroy
the option of using price fixing as a deterrent . Since
individual pricing falls in line with national interests,
this seems to be the most likely situation for the future.
However, the oil weapon can only be employed by the entire
group acting as one. Not only would a price war remove the
blackmail effect of price control, but one of the most power-
ful international cartels would certainly tumble. But, Arab
states may have already priced themselves into a situation
where this alternative no longer can be considered realistic,
Price raises have become so commonplace that they are ex-
pected to be implemented at periodic intervals and not
perceived as a possible political threat.
2. Reduction of Production Levels
The second option is reduction of petroleum produc-
tion levels. Since the producers now control their indus-
tries, they are in a position to control the amount of oil
that is produced for consumption over any given period of
time. Production cutbacks were the main tactic when the
oil weapon was successfully wielded in 1973. The reduced
supplies took the consuming countries by surprise, and left
them at a loss for dealing with the situation. This enabled
cutbacks to become the most effective and efficient tactic
of the three alternatives. Today, however, this approach
is not as promising since reduced production levels through
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voluntary cutbacks have become the standard mode of operation
OPEC oil production for 1975 averaged 17$ below the 1973
1 26third-quarter peak.
Two factors are important in explaining this action.
The main one is reduced world demand for oil. Though the
United States has not been very successful in reducing its
consumption of petroleum products, both Europe and Japan
have successfully cut consumption by an average of slightly
over 10# since 1973. 12 ^ This is a direct result of the
1973 embargo and cutback which forced these countries to
lessen their dependence on Middle Eastern oil both by seeking
other energy sources and by instigating measures to lower
the amount of consumption. The other factor is the desire
of some states to begin conserving their resource against
its eventual exhaustion. This is especially true of coun-
tries with vast revenue surpluses such as Saudi Arabia and
Kuwayt
.
Unlike in 1973 and early 197^, the consequences of
future production cutbacks will be felt more by the producers
than by the consumers, since revenue surpluses will dwindle
causing the smaller producers to begin operating at deficits.
These deficits could not be compensated for by more price
*
"Vast Spending is Rapidly Reducing OPEC Surpluses,"







increases either. Thus, if the Arab states should decide
to use production cutbacks as their option they would be
hurting themselves in the long run, even though the consumers
would still suffer the immediate effects. It would probably
become a waiting game which could result in an embargo of
industrial products to the Arabs as a countermove
3. Embargo
The final option is embargo . This is the only alter-
native of the three that is not an ongoing action, since it
would most likely require another war to cause its imple-
mentation,, The possibility of this strategy being as effec-
tive as it has been in the past grows doubtful,, The lessened
world demand and the probable availability of new non-Arab
sources of petroleum have served to make the Western con-
sumers less fearful of this form of blackmail. The fact
that the Arab states require vast amounts of oil revenues,
coupled with the Western belief that Iran will not join in
an oil boycott in the event of another Arab-Israeli conflict,
aids in supporting this Western conviction. The Shah has
stated explicitly that "we need the last cent of the money
which comes from oil." ° Iran views oil as an economic pro-




129"Iran Would Not Join an Oil Embargo," Middle East
Monitor, v. 5. no„ k, p„ ^, 15 February 1975.
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A further possibility is that, even though all the
Arab states currently declare their support of an embargo
in the event of future hostilities, when the time for actual
implementation comes one or more might decide to boycott the
action. Action of this sort would most likely be caused by
internal financial requirements that are more compelling than
the Arab cause, similar to Iraq's actions in 1973. In all
probability Algeria and Iraq would be the prime candidates
for maintaining supply. They stand to lose the most in lost
revenues. Libya can also ill afford to cut down on exports,
but al-Qadhafi's ambition for leadership would force him to
support the Arab group. Only Saudi Arabia, Kuwayt and the
United Arab Emirates have enough surplus revenues to tide
them over if this action becomes necessary, but they do not
supply enough oil to stand alone on the issue and create a
massive impact. The contention of this thesis is that should
another war break out between the Arabs and Israelis, the
Arabs will no doubt levy an embargo on the supporters of
Israel. However, the overall effect will not reach the pro-
portions achieved in 1973 » and as more alternative energy
sources become available even this action will decrease in
its effect of deterring Western support of Israel.
Taken together, the three options available to the
Arab decision-makers in determining their strategies seem
to show that the oil weapon is becoming less of a credible
deterrent. All sides are beginning to realize that supply
can not exist without demand, and that an equilibrium to
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the mutual agreement and satisfaction of both parties is
actually the only realistic alternative available. Recent
pressing concern on the part of some of the more influential
oil producers for achievement of more constructive producer-
consumer dialogues supports this claim. Oil must be taken
out of the political arena and treated strictly as the
exhaustable and scarce economic resource that it is in such
a way that both the supplier and user can benefit without
taking advantage of each other.
C. THE IMPACT OF THE ARAB DECISIONS ON THE WESTERN WORLD
The Western oil consumers have taken many varied actions
since 1973 "to lessen the impact of any future Arab decisions,
The actions have been functions of the amount of energy de-
pendence. The United States has sought, as yet unsuccess-
fully, to establish policies that would secure energy in-
dependence and prevent further blackmail attempts. France,
Italy, Britain and Japan have negotiated billion dollar
arrangements with the oil producers in an effort towards
securing long term oil supplies as well as creating new
130
markets for their own goods
.
Most of the oil producing nations now have almost total
control of their oil industries. Since foreign companies
represented predominantly Western interests, loss of control
^^ Itayim, F. , "Strength and Weaknesses of the Oil Weapon,"
Adel-phi Papers No. 115: The Middle East and the International
System




has taken away all possibilities for the consuming countries
to have any impact in determining production levels
,
prices
and other similar policies. In most cases technical experts
are available to lend the still needed assistance and advice
to the Arab countries, and this could enable Western inter-
ests and requirements to be at least brought out whenever
the Arab policy makers decide to instigate a new action.
This diverse attitude concerning prices could be both
harmful or beneficial to consuming nations. Constant price
increases could price Arab oil right out of the market. If
prices get too unmanageable, a price war amongst the states
could result. This would definitely threaten the unity of
OPEC and make oil a competitive commodity, thus allowing
consumers to pick and choose
„
Reduced production levels are not having the impact on
consumers that was prevelent in 1973* Widely instigated
conservation measures have successfully lowered world demand.
Arabs have to be aware that unless they could implement very
drastic cuts they really can not effectively threaten the
oil weapon in this manner any more. Further reductions in
production levels would seriously harm some of the smaller
producers who absorb all the revenues now being realized,
and have the capacity to utilize even greater amounts if
available.
The main impact that Arab decision-makers could have on
the oil market is their perception that another embargo is
necessary should oil be needed to insure Arab military
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victory in a future conflict. They also feel that an em-
bargo could be used as a lever, should peace negotiations
be stymied or completely stopped. This option of embargo
remains a perceived and practical deterrent at the present
time. Though the demand for consumption has been reduced,
the Western nations have not obtained energy independence.
These consumers still require importation of Middle Eastern
oil. However, the consumers are constantly working towards
the acquisition of alternative oil sources, and the possi-
bility of the Arabs being able to threaten embargo now lacks
the element of surprise that was once present.
The world is still in an energy crisis situation, but
seems to be working towards an acceptable solution. Oil
will always remain a prime economic resource, and a political
issue. However, since the Arabs are also faced with the
problem of revenue requirements , the petroleum problem is
slowly becoming much less of a political issue and becoming
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